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Abstract. This paper is an empirical investigation into the question of whether increased independence
aﬀects central bank behavior, in particular when monetary policy is already in an inflation targeting
regime. We take advantage of the unique experience in that sense of the United Kingdom, where the
Bank of England was granted operational independence from Her Majesty’s Treasury only in May 1997,
while inflation targeting had been implemented since October 1992. Our strategy is to estimate Taylor
rules employing alternative specifications, econometric methods and variable proxies in search for robust
results that survive most of those modifications. The key lesson we extract from UK quarterly data
is that the Bank of England has responded to the output gap, and not at all to output growth, the
more so after receiving operational independence, when the gap has been positive or close to zero and
inflation credibly stabilized at target. We find no unambiguous evidence for any definite change in
the Bank’s reaction to inflation or in the degree of its interest rate smoothing. Our main import is
to argue that both the asymmetry of the monetary policy reaction function across the cycle and the
response to the output gap, not growth, are fully consistent with New Keynesian theory, especially
under inflation targeting. Anchored inflation and economic expansion during the post-independence
period thus complement greater autonomy in influencing the behavior of the Bank of England, yet clear
separation of the individual contribution of each of these eﬀects appears challenging given our short
sample.
JEL classification codes. E52, E58, F41.
Date : October 2005 (First draft: June 2005).
Key words and phrases. Asymmetry of monetary policy reaction function across the business cycle, response to output
gap vs output growth, Taylor rules, (central bank) operational independence, (flexible) inflation targeting, United Kingdom.
I thank Fabio Alessandrini and Efrem Castelnuovo for useful feedback on earlier drafts. Comments are wel-
come. The usual disclaimer applies. Department of Economics, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colch-
ester CO4 3SQ, United Kingdom; +44 (0)1206 87 3351 (phone); +44 (0)1206 87 2724 (fax); mihailov@essex.ac.uk;
http://www.essex.ac.uk/economics/people/staﬀ/mihailov.shtm.
1
2 ALEXANDER MIHAILOV
Contents
List of Tables 2
List of Figures 2
1. The Recent UK Monetary Framework as an ‘Economic Experiment’ 3
2. A Taxonomy of Taylor Rules in a Uniform Notation 4
2.1. Origins of Monetary Rules 4
2.2. The Taylor Rule 5
2.3. Generalized Taylor(-Type) Rules 8
3. Data and Preliminary Tests 11
3.1. Data 11
3.2. Preliminary Tests 12
4. Estimation Methods, Specifications Estimated and Key Findings 13
4.1. Ordinary Least Squares: Classic and Backward-Looking Taylor Rules 14
4.2. Two-Stage Least Squares: Classic and Backward-Looking Taylor Rules 16
4.3. Generalized Method of Moments: Forward-Looking Taylor Rules 16
5. Concluding Comments 22
6. Appendix A: Data and Estimation Output 24
7. Appendix B: Analytical Derivation of Delta Method Standard Errors 39
7.1. The Delta Method: Essence and Literature 39
7.2. The Delta Method: Application to Forward-Looking Taylor Rules 39
7.3. The Delta Method: Application to Backward-Looking Taylor Rules 47
References 48
List of Tables
1 Descriptive Statistics of the Data 24
2 Classic Taylor Rules: OLS Estimates on RPI and Final Real GDP Gap 25
3 Chow Tests on Classic Taylor Rules with Final Real GDP Gap Data 26
4 Backward-Looking Taylor Rules: OLS Estimates on RPI and Final Real GDP Gap 27
5 Classic Taylor Rules: TSLS Estimates on RPI and Final Real GDP Gap 28
6 Forward-Looking Taylor Rules: GMM Estimates on RPI 29
7 Forward-Looking Taylor Rules: GMM Estimates on RPIX and Real-Time Real GDP Gap 30
8 Forward-Looking Taylor Rules: GMM Estimates on RPISA 31
9 Forward-Looking Taylor Rules: GMM Estimates on RPIXSA and Real-Time Real GDP Gap 32
10 Forward-Looking Taylor Rules: GMM Estimates on RPI and Real GDP Growth 33
11 Forward-Looking Taylor Rules: GMM Estimates on RPI, Real GDP Gap and NEER 34
List of Figures
1 UK: Evolution of Bank of England’s Reference Interest Rate 35
2 UK under Inflation Targeting: 3-Month Treasury Bill Rate 35
3 UK Price Level Evolution: RPI vs RPIX 36
4 UK Output Evolution: Final Real GDP vs Real-Time Real GDP 36
5 UK under Inflation Targeting: RPI Inflation vs RPIX Inflation 37
6 UK under Inflation Targeting: Real GDP Growth, Final vs Real-Time Data 37
7 UK under Inflation Targeting: Final Real GDP Gap 38
8 UK under Inflation Targeting: Real-Time Real GDP Gap 38
HAS MORE INDEPENDENCE AFFECTED BANK OF ENGLAND’S REACTION FUNCTION? 3
1. The Recent UK Monetary Framework as an ‘Economic Experiment’
This paper makes an attempt to gain insights from a type of institutional change that arises only
rarely in economic contexts. More precisely, our objective here is to address the question whether,
and how, increased independence aﬀects central bank behavior. We examine this issue under inflation
targeting, the monetary strategy that has become dominant in the modern world, and in terms of
empirically recovered policy reaction functions. We thus want to see what lessons can be learnt from
a regime shift, to central bank operational independence, within a stable broader policy framework,
of inflation-forecast targeting. This particular ‘economic experiment’ has been reflected in the recent
experience with monetary policy making in the United Kingdom (UK). UK monetary authorities moved
to inflation(-forecast) targeting in October 1992, and in May 1997 the Bank of England (BoE) was
formally granted operational independence from Her Majesty’s (HM) Treasury. Because of the explicit
public announcement of the timing of these changes, toward inflation targeting and toward operational
independence, both could be interpreted as exogenous. We therefore see in that a rare opportunity to
explore and disentangle — to the extent possible — the eﬀect(s) of increased central bank independence
on (i.e., in addition to) policy responses under inflation targeting. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first paper to directly address the interesting issue summarized in the title.
There are, of course, huge literatures on both central bank independence and inflation targeting,
but in isolation. We believe that the contribution of the present econometric study is to look at their
intersection. In a broader sense, theoretical and empirical models of monetary policy are abundant as
well. The same goes for a particular subset of these models, namely those focusing on simple instrument,
or Taylor, rules — due to Taylor (1993) who proposed and illustrated such a rule on data for the United
States (US) — describing monetary policy, also referred to as central bank feedback rules or reaction
functions. To have a method of measurement and analysis that is — as it should be in an initial paper
on a topic — enough straightforward and objective, we opt here for an application of Taylor rules to
UK inflation targeting data. Extensions to a richer methodology or to other country cases in similar
monetary circumstances thus remain for further research. Our sample for the present study consists
of quarterly observations, mostly because GDP-related data, used to measure the output gap term in
Taylor rules, are much more precise at a quarterly frequency.1 It purposefully begins in October 1992,
when inflation targeting was introduced in the UK, to be split in two subsamples in May 1997, when
operational independence was granted to the Bank of England, thus covering completely the Bank’s pre-
and post-independence periods of inflation targeting until now. We essentially build on Clarida, Galí and
Gertler (1997, 1998 a, b, 1999, 2000) and the broader empirical (and theoretical) literature on monetary
policy reaction functions within the New Keynesian macromodel but also on Nelson (2000, 2001, 2003)
and the relevant Taylor rule studies on the UK quoted further down.
We are well aware of the major criticisms concerning the Taylor rule approach to monetary policy
interpretation. It is true that (i) such single-equation techniques are overly simplistic; yet they represent
a good initial benchmark in summarizing the outcomes of monetary policy, which can then be cross-
checked by a more complete system estimation (e.g., VAR methods). It is true as well that (ii) Taylor
rules are often unstable, the more so over longer time spans and with more structural breaks in the data;
but this is, in fact, duly reflected in our motivation for the present paper and addressed in it. That is
particularly why we take advantage of the ‘economic experiment’ provided by the UK inflation targeting
experience, and we do so in relatively short subsamples: before and after the publicly announced major
policy change, namely the granting of operational independence to the Bank of England in May 1997,
with the broader Bank monetary strategy remaining otherwise essentially unchanged. Finally, no matter
the original Taylor (1993) rule and its well-known good visual fit to US post Bretton Woods data, the
literature that followed has investigated (iii) a number of varieties of central bank reaction functions.
These include, as we shall discuss: (a) other variables, notably the lagged dependent variable (interpreted
as interest rate smoothing), the exchange rate (explicitly) and the price level (in the so-called hybrid
rules) in addition to the inflation rate and the output gap (or real output growth, as preferred by
certain authors); (b) backward-looking (adaptive) behavior and forward-looking (rational) expectations
formation of economic agents — notably, the central bank — involving shorter or longer horizons (lag/lead
structure); (c) higher (i.e., monthly) data frequency; (d) nonlinear functional forms.
1However, it may be desirable to revisit the robustness of our findings here with monthly data as well. Monthly data will
allow for a three times higher number of observations per (sub)sample, and will thus very likely increase the quality of the
statistical output. Moreover, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England meets to decide on its interest
rate instrument every month. And, finally, by now there are reliable monthly indicators of GDP in most industrialized
countries, including the UK.
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To reduce this diversity of feedback equations as potential descriptions of monetary policy in the
context we are interested in, we first of all limit attention to the period of UK inflation targeting only,
1992-2004. We then allow for several versions of the estimated Taylor rules, selecting them with view
to their relevance to our methods of econometric estimation and to the particular country, the UK, we
study here. It is interesting to note that we rely on instrument rules of the Taylor type to capture (ex
post) the essential features of monetary policy in the UK, the latter being normatively defined (ex ante)
by a targeting rule with respect to inflation forecasts. We duly clarify the slight diﬀerence implied by
this terminology later on and argue that our methodology would not be incorrect, even in the British
institutional context, as a positive description of Bank of England’s actual monetary policy.
In a preview of our main findings, classic Taylor rules perform in an impressive way in describing UK
monetary policy throughout the period of operational independence when estimated by Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) and Two-Stage Least Squares (TSLS); moreover, they indicate that the Bank of England
has definitely responded to the output gap after — but not before — receiving greater autonomy. However,
because of the well-known critique to such contemporaneous specifications, we place predominant weight
on our empirical results from forward-looking Taylor rules incorporating interest rate smoothing based
on the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). These results confirm what OLS and TSLS have partly
uncovered earlier. Our key contribution consists in finding that during inflation targeting (i) the Bank
of England has reacted to the output gap but not to output growth and that (ii) it has done so in an
asymmetric way: under conditions of economic expansion near to and beyond (the available estimates of)
potential output, as those having prevailed in the post-independence subsample, the Bank has responded
much more aggressively relative to the pre-independence subsample, when the British economy has been
(farther) below from potential. We thus present evidence that the Bank’s de facto behavior could be
characterized as flexible inflation targeting, i.e., one also paying attention to the output gap in addition
to inflation, as is imposed on the Bank de jure, and not strict inflation targeting. As for the magnitude of
the reaction to inflation and the degree of interest rate smoothing, we do not find overwhelming evidence
to be able to conclude in favor of any important, substantial change across our two subsamples. Finally,
it proves diﬃcult to disentangle the eﬀect(s) of operational independence from those of the business cycle
and of the low inflation stabilized at target, and future research will be needed.2
The paper is further down structured as follows. In the next section we first summarize the minimum
required theoretical and empirical background that we need to introduce the literature in a special-
purpose notation and to justify our econometric approaches later on. Section 3 then describes the data
and some preliminary tests. Section 4 presents our alternative estimation methods and specifications of
Taylor rules, discussing the numerous econometric results we obtain and oﬀering a unifying interpretation
of our principal findings, and section 5 concludes. Sections 6 and 7 serve the role of appendices (referred
to as A and B, respectively): Appendix A documents the most important features of our data and
econometric results in tables and figures; Appendix B contains, in turn, a detailed analytical derivation
of the formulas we used for the (approximate) computation of standard errors for most policy response
coeﬃcients based on the delta method.
2. A Taxonomy of Taylor Rules in a Uniform Notation
2.1. Origins of Monetary Rules. Woodford (2003), chapter 1, traces the intellectual history of policy
reaction functions back to the works Wicksell (1898, 1907).
2.1.1. The Wicksellian Rule. Wicksell (1898), as quoted in Woodford (2003), advocated not only a fiat
money regime for the world as a whole (in place of the then existing gold standard) but also price-level
targeting as a preferable monetary strategy. Although Wicksell expressed such ideas in words, Woodford
(2003), p. 38, interprets them mathematically in the form of what he sometimes calls a simpleWicksellian
(interest rate) rule for the management of such a fiat monetary system:
iTt = i+ φpt,
2A companion paper, Mihailov (2005), summarizes the developments in the British institutional framework for monetary
policy making since the early 1990s and the current goals and instruments of the Bank of England. It relies only on forward -
looking Taylor rules estimated via GMM and focuses on the final vs real-time data opposition to identify and interpret the
feedback and stance of monetary policy in the UK. We here go beyond all of these aspects, addressing the specific question
of the title in terms of robust analysis of Bank of England’s reaction function.
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where iTt is the current-period target nominal interest rate (NIR),
3 i is the (constant) ‘equilibrium’
NIR, pt is (the log of) some general price index (which the monetary authority aims to stabilize) and
φ > 0 is a response coeﬃcient; or, alternatively,
∆iTt = φπt,
where πt ≡ ∆pt is the inflation rate over a preceding period of relevance to the corresponding (ex
post) NIR.4 The principal benefit from such a rule is that, as Woodford (2003) argues in chapter 2 of his
book, it is able to stabilize the price index around a constant level.
2.1.2. Monetary Rules and (In)Determinacy of Rational Expectations Equilibrium. Research on mon-
etary policy rules revived with a new impetus in the mid-1970s, following the rational expectations
revolution in economic theory. Sargent and Wallace (1975), in particular, criticized interest rate rules of
the Wicksellian (or Keynesian) kind from the point of view of the determinacy of rational expectations
equilibrium, in the sense of a unique equilibrium satisfying certain bounds. They argued that, unlike
money supply rules in the monetarist tradition, interest rate rules led to indeterminacy. McCallum
(1981), however, made clear that this indeterminacy result applies only when the interest rate rule is
specified as a function of exogenous variables, e.g., the history of exogenous disturbances. By contrast,
if the nominal interest rate is specified as a function of endogenous variables — such as, for example,
inflation in the Wicksellian rule above and the output gap in the Taylor rule to be discussed below — the
problem of indeterminacy does not arise.
Further debates on monetary policy rules have materialized in proposals for alternative specifications.
We briefly review the most important among them, which will be of relevance for clarity of exposition
and for the econometric methods applied in the present study.
2.1.3. The Goodhart Rule. Similarly to Wicksell (1898, 1907) and again in a discursive style, Good-
hart (1992) has more recently suggested a monetary policy reaction function that would algebraically —
according to Woodford (2003), p. 40 — look like:
iTt = 3 + 1.5πt.
Goodhart (1992), p. 324, interprets this rule in the sense that, starting from zero inflation and 3 per
cent nominal interest rate, the target interest rate should rise by 1.5 per cent for each 1 per cent increase
of inflation. Notice that the Goodhart rule has the level of the nominal interest rate set in proportion to
inflation, with a coeﬃcient of proportionality of 1.5. In the Wicksellian rule, by contrast, the relation is
either between pure levels, as in the first specification (with iTt and pt involved), or between pure changes
(with ∆iTt and ∆pt ≡ πt).
2.2. The Taylor Rule. The Taylor rule is an interest rate rule that also includes an output gap term
in addition to an inflation (and not price level) term in the policy reaction functions implicitly suggested
by Wicksell (1898, 1907) and Goodhart (1992). As Taylor (1993) has insisted and as Woodford (2003),
p. 39, has stressed, such a feedback rule can be regarded both as a rough positive description of the
way monetary policy had actually been made and as a straightforward normative prescription of how
monetary policy should optimally be conducted.5
There is some ambiguity in the subsequent literature, in particular with respect to the alternative
writings available in it for the original Taylor rule. We next clarify this — perhaps minor — detail, as we
shall use the original Taylor rule as a point of departure and as a benchmark for comparison in both the
theoretical and empirical part of the present study.
3Woodford (2003) uses the simpler notation it, but we would here and further down be explicit in distinguishing the
targeted interest rate, iTt , from the actual one, it.
4More precisely, πt ≡ ∆pt ≡ pt − pt−k ≡ lnPt − lnPt−k ≡ ∆ lnPt ≡ ln PtPt−k and ∆i
T
t ≡ iTt − iTt−k = φ (pt − pt−k),
with k being an integer, most frequently 1 (for annual data), 4 (for quarterly data) or 12 (for monthly data); the rule
written in diﬀerences of the interest rate thus results from the one in levels.
5The normative implication has emerged from stochastic simulation of a number of econometric models Taylor (1993)
and Henderson and McKibbin (1993) undertook and published at nearly the same time.
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2.2.1. The Original Taylor Rule. The monetary policy rule Taylor (1993) proposed was, in its original
notation (without time subscripts), p. 202, eq. (1):
(2.1) r = p+ 0.5y + 0.5 (p− 2) + 2,
where, in the words of Taylor, r is the federal funds rate,6 p is the rate of inflation over the previous
four quarters7 and y is the percent deviation of real GDP from a target, i.e.,
y = 100× Y − Y
∗
Y ∗
,
with Y denoting real GDP and Y ∗ (linear-)trend real GDP, the latter growing by 2.2% per year for
the Taylor (1993) sample, 1984:1 through 1992:2 (34 quarters).
The first constant 2 in (2.1), in the brackets, stands for the inflation target of the monetary authority
and is assumed to be, in the US case for the sample period, 2% p.a.; the second constant 2, the last
term in (2.1), is the ‘equilibrium’ real rate,8 itself chosen so as to be close to the assumed steady-state
growth rate of the economy of 2.2% (that is, as measured by the linear-trend real GDP growth). The
interpretation Taylor (1993) himself, p. 202, suggested to (2.1) was the following:
”The policy rule ... has the feature that the federal funds rate rises if inflation increases
above a target of 2 percent or if real GDP rises above trend GDP. If both the inflation
rate and real GDP are on target, then the federal funds rate would equal 4 percent, or
2 percent in real terms.”
Taylor (1993) further emphasized that the policy rule he proposed had the same coeﬃcient, 0.5 in
(2.1), on the deviation of real GDP from trend and on the deviation of the inflation rate from target.
This particular numerical relation has later been named the ‘Taylor principle’; yet it has often been
interpreted in an equivalent, but diﬀerently written way: namely that the corresponding coeﬃcient on
inflation (and on its deviation from target too, in still another writing, as made clear below) should be
1.5. The essential point here is that the response of the monetary authorities to a rise in the inflation rate
should be stronger, or elastic, in the sense of exceeding 1. Moreover, such a response has been claimed
consistent with ensuring a unique, stationary, rational expectations equilibrium in the economy.
To see the link between the 0.5 coeﬃcient on the deviation of inflation from target in the original Taylor
rule and the 1.5 coeﬃcient on inflation in subsequent interpretations of the rule, start by rewriting (2.1)
as:
r = p+ 0.5y + 0.5p− 0.5× 2 + 2,
r = (2− 0.5× 2)| {z }
const
+ 1.5p+ 0.5y.
Then change the original notation for the variables in Taylor (1993) with a corresponding more
standard and time-indexed notation,9 r = iTt , y = xt ≡ yt−yPt (with yPt denoting the trend in real GDP,
often considered as the potential output, itself a natural GDP target for any government), and p = πt,
to obtain:
iTt = (2− 0.5× 2)| {z }
const
+ 1.5πt + 0.5
¡
yt − yPt
¢
.
Now substitute the original numerically-expressed constants by respective general symbols — that is,
the equilibrium real rate, 2, by r∗ and the inflation target, 2, by πT — to get:
(2.2) iTt =
¡
r∗ − 0.5× πT ¢| {z }
const
+ 1.5πt + 0.5
¡
yt − yPt
¢
.
6That is, the short-term interest rate target for monetary policy in the US context.
7In % p.a., that is, p ≡ 100× Pt−Pt−4Pt−4 , as implicit in Taylor (1993).
8Of return or of interest, Taylor (1993) remains not specific about that, although the real interest rate is rather
understood in this particular context.
9In fact, our notation further down basically follows Walsh (2003), chapter 11, with also some influence from Woodford
(2003), chapter 1. However, we adapt this notation a good deal, to suitably fit the purposes of our exposition and the
techniques applied later.
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(2.2) is the original Taylor rule reformulated in terms of the actually observed current-period rate of
inflation, πt. One can now see why the coeﬃcient on actual inflation implied by the originally specified
Taylor rule should be 1.5, exactly the same as the analogous one in the Goodhart rule above!
Further, add and subtract 1.5πT in the right-hand side (RHS) of (2.2):
iTt = r
∗ − 0.5× πT + 1.5πT + 1.5πt − 1.5πT + 0.5
¡
yt − yPt
¢
,
to finally arrive at
(2.3) iTt =
¡
r∗ + πT
¢| {z }
≡iT=const
+ 1.5
¡
πt − πT
¢
+ 0.5
¡
yt − yPt
¢
.
(2.3) is the original Taylor rule reformulated in terms of the (constant) nominal interest rate (NIR)
target, iT ≡ r∗ + πT , implied by a situation in which the economy has achieved both other targets, for
inflation and for output, so that both deviation terms in (2.3) are zero. As clear from the definition, the
targeted (constant) NIR equals the equilibrium (constant) real interest rate (RIR), r∗, plus the (constant)
target rate of inflation, πT . The latter inflation target is thus, in eﬀect, assumed to be the anchor to
which expected inflation would converge. One can also easily see from (2.3) why the coeﬃcient on the
deviation of actual inflation from target, πt−πT , often termed inflation gap, should be 1.5 as well, in the
version of the original Taylor rule with intercept equal to the equilibrium RIR plus the inflation target.
Note, however, the diﬀerences across (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3). (2.1) suggests numerically identical equi-
librium RIR, potential (or trend) output, and inflation target, all (constant and) equal to 2% p.a.
(r∗ = yP = πT = 2) and — in a symmetric way — quantitatively identical policy response coeﬃcients
(0.5 each) on the deviation of both actual inflation from target and actual output from potential. (2.2)
is, as we said, a reformulation of (2.1) in terms of actual inflation, allowing econometric estimation
when the inflation target is unknown; in it, the response coeﬃcient to inflation duly changes to 1.5,
with the one for the output gap remaining 0.5. (2.3), finally, is a third version of the original Taylor
rule, allowing for an interpretation of the intercept of the regression as the desired (constant) NIR in
equilibrium, iT ≡ r∗ + πT ; the policy reaction parameters are again quantified at 1.5 and 0.5, but now
with regard to the deviation of inflation and output from their respective targets (as in (2.1) but now
with a diﬀerent intercept). We point out to the particular numerical values of the response coeﬃcients
in the feedback rules originally proposed by Taylor (1993) and Goodhart (1992) because their (relative)
magnitude has often been discussed in the literature, usually without the distinction among the three
versions we introduced here having been made clear or well understood. We shall also refer to these
quantitative benchmarks for the policy response parameters when discussing later on our related results.
2.2.2. Classic Taylor Rules. Generalizing the policy rule still further — and adapting again largely Walsh’s
(2003) textbook notation, as we mostly did above10 — we could replace the numerical coeﬃcients which
Taylor (1993) postulated (without attempting to estimate at all) as ”round numbers that make for
easy discussion” (p. 202) by corresponding letters denoting any constants, i.e., parameters that can be
estimated from the data:
(2.4) iTt = i
T + bπ,0
¡
πt − πT
¢
+ bx,0xt,
with iT ≡ r∗+πT , xt ≡ yt− yPt , and bj,l denoting the coeﬃcient to the respective variable of interest
(expressed by the relevant letter according to our notation) j = π, x, i (j = 0 stands for some compound
intercept terms later on, as will become clear) at a respective lag(−)/lead(+) (expressed by an integer
number) l = ...,−2,−1, 0,+1,+2, ... (l = 0 designates, of course, a contemporaneous, or current-period,
response). We can estimate (2.4), as specified with contemporaneous response parameters, directly from
the data (for iTt , πt and xt) if we know the inflation target (πT ); if we do not know it, (2.4) can be
written as
10Except that Walsh (2003), chapter 11, uses xt to designate the gap in real GDP. We shall switch to the xt output gap
symbol as well from now on. Yet up to here we have preferred to keep our notation yt − yPt because it makes explicit that
the variable in question is the real GDP gap : this is important, especially in the case of Taylor rule empirical estimation,
since some authors have argued against the use of an imprecise and methodologically contentious output gap measure and
in favour of a version of the rule where real GDP growth replaces the real GDP gap. We present futher down econometric
estimates of both these types of policy reaction functions. Notice as well that yt−yPt can be reduced to yt−yP , as implied,
in fact, by the original Taylor rule. In an inverse sense, πt−πT , as above, can be left more general by writing it as πt−πTt ,
so that an inflation target which changes through time may also be allowed for.
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(2.5) iTt =
¡
iT − bπ,0πT
¢| {z }
≡b0,0=const
+ bπ,0πt + bx,0xt
and estimated in the form of (2.5). Observe at this point a tricky interrelation (or transformation)
across the intercept terms in the above Taylor rule equations, usually not very explicit in the literature:
(2.6) b0,0 ≡ iT − bπ,0πT ≡ r∗ + πT| {z }
≡iT
− bπ,0πT ≡ r∗ + (1− bπ,0)πT = const,
so that b0,0 6= iT 6= r∗ 6= πT 6= bπ,0.
Note as well another analytical insight from our detailed discussion here, which often remains am-
biguous (even if implicit) in the numerous and diverse papers on Taylor rules: estimating (2.4) when
the target rate of inflation is known (and constant) will result in arriving at the same policy response
parameters (in sign and magnitude) as estimating (2.5) when the inflation target is unknown (but con-
stant), bπ,0 in both equations (and also bx,0). In such parallel regressions, the only diﬀerence across the
two estimation specifications will be the magnitude (and, potentially, sign) of the intercept: iT in (2.4)
and b0,0 in (2.5).
(2.4) with πT = 2.5% p.a. (being most appropriate for the UK during the inflation targeting period, as
discussed further down) and (2.5) were, in fact, the first Taylor rule equations we estimated, by ordinary
least squares (OLS) and by two-stage least squares (TSLS), as we report later on. Following in part
Woodford (2003), p. 21, we would refer to this more general version of the original Taylor rule, insofar
all of its coeﬃcients are not restricted to specific numerical values, as classic Taylor rules.
The subsequent literature has criticized the original (or classic) Taylor rule, mostly because of the
serial correlation usually found in the error term and the potential endogeneity problem arising from
the contemporaneous regressors in it, the latter also posing unrealistic informational requirements to the
monetary authority. Feedback functions of the type have therefore been augmented in a number of ways.
We summarize below the most important among them, also corresponding to the versions we estimated
on UK data.
2.2.3. Naïve Taylor Rules. To address some of the critiques towards the original Taylor rule, in particular
the problem of endogeneity, research in the area has further shifted to estimating what Nelson (2000), p.
13, calls naïve Taylor rules. In a naïve Taylor rule both gap measures, in real GDP and in inflation, are
included with one lag, thus precluding the possibility for a correlation between the explanatory variables
and the disturbance term when running regressions. In addition to that econometric justification, an
informational one has been added: it is not realistic for the central bank to dispose of (precise) current-
period information (although forecasts can be used) when reacting to changes in the economic and
monetary environment, so that the contemporaneous response to the regressors in the classic Taylor rule
has thus been eliminated as well. The reason for branding this type of feedback rules ‘naïve’ is, according
to Nelson (2000), to distinguish it from reaction functions which incorporate more extensive dynamics,
in particular interest rate smoothing or forward -looking policy behavior, as we shall discuss in greater
detail below.
To be more precise, Nelson (2000) specifies and estimates by OLS naïve Taylor rules of the form:
(2.7) iTt =
¡
iT − bπ,−1πT
¢| {z }
≡b0,−1=const
+ bπ,−1πt−1 + bx,−1xt−1,
where actual inflation registered during the past period replaces the current-period deviation of infla-
tion from target in the original Taylor rule and where the output gap enters as well with a one-period
lag. Notice that b0,0 in (2.5) is not the same as b0,−1 in (2.7) insofar the latter regression is estimated
with a lag of 1 relative to the former.
2.3. Generalized Taylor(-Type) Rules. Continuing widespread problems of residual autocorrelation
in econometric estimation of classic and naïve Taylor rules have further led to two approaches. One of
them has tried to identify the order of serial correlation and duly correct for it, by adding autoregressive
error terms in the estimated regressions (mostly of order 1, with quarterly data). The second common
approach has been to introduce a more realistic partial adjustment model for the nominal interest rate,
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eﬀectively resulting in including a lagged dependent variable. The latter type of policy reaction functions
has become known as interest rate smoothing Taylor rules.
2.3.1. Interest Rate Smoothing Taylor Rules. Central banks usually implement their policy in a way
that smooths their operating instrument, i.e., the short-term nominal interest rate.11 This is consistent
with a Taylor rule specification of the form12
(2.8) iTt = b0,0 + bπ,0πt + bx,0xt + bi,−1it−1.
We return to such interest rate smoothing policy reaction functions and their microfoundations when
discussing the New Keynesian theoretical underpinnings of our GMM estimation in section 4.
2.3.2. Backward-Looking (or History-Dependent) Taylor Rules. Combining (2.7) and (2.8) and allowing
for a richer dynamics has then led to backward-looking reaction functions, which can generally be written
in the form:
(2.9) iTt = b0,−n +
NX
n=1
bπ,−nπt−n +
NX
n=1
bx,−nxt−n +
NX
n=1
bi,−nit−n,
with the dynamic structure truncated at some relevant lag length N . This is the backward-looking
rule which Nelson (2000, 2001, 2003) estimated for N = 1, 2 across 5 sample periods of British quarterly
(and monthly, for the shortest subsample) data between 1972 and 1997 in his ‘Taylor rule guide to
UK monetary policy’. Note that it is again simply the actual inflation rate, not its deviation form
target, which enters (2.9). Furthermore, Nelson (2000, 2001, 2003) restricts all three RHS variables
to have the same lag length, N , which is too stringent. In general, the lag length can be diﬀerent
for each of the explanatory variables and selected according to a relevant statistic such as the Akaike
or Schwartz information criteria. However, estimation of all sorts of backward -looking Taylor rules is
nowadays oversimplistic, given that rational agents, including the central bank, anticipate and forecast
the variables of key interest to them. We therefore emphasize our results from forward-looking rules
for the UK, although we estimated backward-looking rules as well. Nelson (2000, 2001, 2003) applied
a similar approach but for periods before operational independence and relying on OLS and TSLS,
whereas we have also used GMM over our two inflation targeting subsamples — notably, over the one
after operational independence — as will be explained in more detail in section 4.
2.3.3. Forward-Looking (or Rational-Expectations) Taylor Rules. In accordance with considerations of
rationality in economic behavior, the literature on policy reaction functions has further developed to
complement backward-looking specifications with forward-looking ones. Such versions of the Taylor rule
assume rational expectations, not naïve extrapolation. Moreover, forward-looking central bank feedback
functions have recently been grounded in microfounded macroeconomic theory, and thus have a deep
theoretical justification.
2.3.4. Optimal Policy Rules: Instrument Rules vs Targeting Rules. Woodford (2003), p. 58, has recently
argued that optimal policy rules, i.e., feedback rules derived from explicit models, such as the New
Keynesian model of monetary policy (without and with microfoundations) will usually be both forward-
looking and backward-looking, and that the lead and lag horizons in them will not be too long.
”... Moreover, the optimal rules that I obtain are also typically diﬀerent in their dynamic
specifications. Optimal rules are history dependent in ways other than those of the
classic Taylor rule or familiar descriptions of inflation-forecast targeting; and while they
may well be more forward-looking than the classic Taylor rule, in all of the calibrated
examples they are considerably less forward-looking than the procedures currently used
in the inflation-targeting central banks.” Woodford (2003), p. 58.
11More recently in most advanced market economies, the overnight repo rate in the market for bank reserves (also more
generally known as the money market, hence the money market rate).
12We should have, more precisely, written iTt = b
sm
0,0 + bπ,0πt + bx,0xt + bi,−1it−1 instead, where the sm superscript to
b0,0 distinguishes this particular intercept from earlier ones on the basis that now an additional, lagged dependent variable
is included in the regression. However, we have decided to avoid any further complication of the notation when accountimg
for details of a lesser importance. Moreover, b0,0 in (2.5) = b0,0 in (2.8), apart from the added third regressor.
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That is why we focus in the analytical as well as empirical part of our study on Taylor rules that are
both forward-looking, in inflation and the output gap, and backward-looking, in the interest rate, but at
the same time have a simple(r) dynamic structure.
Svensson (1999, 2003) insisted to distinguish targeting rules as opposed to interest rate rules of the
kind described thus far. In fact, targeting rules are a major competitor of Taylor rules in the recent
literature as well as practice on monetary policy. Perhaps the best-known example of a targeting rule
is inflation-forecast targeting. Vickers (1998), among others, has used it to explain the monetary policy
framework implemented since 1992 in the United Kingdom, which is of particular relevance to the present
study. There is no formula prescribed for setting an interest rate operating target under inflation-forecast
targeting. The Bank of England is free to set this target at whatever level is consistent with its inflation
forecast in order to meet a certain target criterion. The latter criterion may however well resemble,
as Svensson (1999) has pointed out, the right-hand side of a forward-looking Taylor rule (without the
interest rate smoothing term).
Woodford (2003), e.g., p. 58, furthermore argues that optimal rules can easily take the form of
generalized Taylor rules or of target criteria for a forecast-targeting procedure. We have therefore not
discarded the Taylor rule as a potential ex post description of actually materialized monetary policy only
because, on a normative basis, the Bank of England does not explicitly follow an instrument rule but
a targeting rule. We believe that our results support to a large extent the usefulness of Taylor rules in
deriving certain lessons on the actual outcomes of central bank behavior, even in the UK under inflation
targeting. As a first study of the particular issue of interest here, our paper restricts attention to rather
conventional functional forms and estimation approaches. Further research could, of course, go into more
detail and complication.
2.3.5. Real GDP Growth Instead of Real GDP Gap. Mostly because of the well-known problems in
measuring the true output gap, which cannot be observed, some researchers have proposed to use the
rate of real GDP growth instead of the real GDP gap when estimating central bank policy reaction
functions. Such feedback rules, however, seem to us inappropriate for this purpose, essentially because
of theoretical reasons. We shall try to make the point clearly later on, while discussing our principal
findings.
2.3.6. Exchange-Rate Augmented Taylor Rules. The literature on Taylor rules has gone further to es-
timate specifications that explicitly include one or more (contemporaneous and lagged) exchange rate
terms. This has been found logical especially in the case of small open economies. However, Taylor
(2000) argues that there is no need to do so, since even if the exchange rate may matter a lot for a small
open economy, its dynamics will be reflected (almost immediately) in the dynamics of the price level,
that is, in inflation as well. So, once an inflation term is included in the Taylor rule, the exchange rate
is always implicit in the equation, via its pass-through onto consumer prices. We have, nevertheless,
controlled for an exchange rate term, and our results will be reported in section 4.
2.3.7. Nonstationary Taylor-Type Policy Rules. As recently pointed out by Gerlach-Kristen (2003), the
empirical literature on policy reaction functions has usually ignored the issue of (non-)stationarity of
the variables taken into account. She explores the econometric properties of the traditional Taylor rule
model using euro area quarterly data for 1998-2002 and finds signs of instability and misspecification.
She then estimates interest rates rules using the cointegration approach and claims that such rules are
stable in sample and forecast better out of sample. The findings of Gerlach-Kristen (2003) are certainly
of interest. Moreover, nonstationarity seems relevant for part — but not all — of the UK time series we
include in our Taylor rule estimation, as we discuss later on. In this sense, a cointegrated approach may
deserve attention in future research. In our case, however, because of (i) the relatively short subsamples
(the pre-independence one containing 18 quarterly observations) and (ii) the low power of unit root
tests in such short (sub)samples, as well as, more importantly, because of (iii) the theoretical reasons for
stationary rates of interest and inflation and for a stationary output gap and (iv) the likely stationarity of
our Hodrick-Prescott filtered measure for the real GDP gap, we keep in the tradition — defended notably
by Clarida-Galí-Gertler (1997, 1998 a, b, 2000) — and abstain from cointegrated reaction functions in
this particular study.
2.3.8. Nonlinear Taylor-Type Policy Rules. More recently, the literature has also turned to explore po-
tential nonlinearities in the feedback rule. For example, Martin and Milas (2004) and Kesriyeli, Osborn
and Sensier (2004) have directly addressed such issues with UK data and Surico (2004) with US data.
No matter that this is another interesting, and perhaps promising, avenue for future research, in this
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first attempt to learn something about the eﬀects of the Bank of England’s operational independence
on inflation targeting by examining Taylor rules we here abstract from nonlinear functional forms. Nev-
ertheless, we do find evidence for another kind of nonlinearity, in the sense of an asymmetric policy
response of the UK monetary authority before and after operational independence to the output gap,
largely due to the business cycle, as we argue further down.
2.3.9. Hybrid Monetary Policy Rules. A final notion to mention in the taxonomy of monetary policy
reaction functions we briefly reviewed in the present section is the hybrid rule. These are rules which
include both inflation and the price level as policy response variables, in addition to the output gap. As
Jääskelä (2005) points out, the debate on price level and inflation targeting was triggered by Fischer
(1994), and a substantial literature developed out of it in the last decade. Nessén and Vestin (2000), for
instance, show that the performance of a hybrid target can be superior to a price level target and to an
inflation target, taken separately, if commitments of an inflation targeting central bank are not feasible.
Batini and Yates (2003), on the other hand, study the pros and cons of (non-optimized) hybrid rules
in an open-economy context when policy makers are able to commit. A conclusion in Jääskelä (2005)
is that it does not make sense to include the price level in a policy rule when inflation expectations
are backward-looking; but when they are forward-looking, the price level rule and the hybrid rule are
superior to the standard (inflation-based) Taylor rule under certainty about the structural parameters
of the model; however, the standard (optimized) Taylor rule is more robust to model uncertainty than
both those alternatives. This is another reason to focus our initial analysis here on the simplest case of
forward-looking Taylor rules with interest rate smoothing, rather than hybrid, nonlinear or nonstationary
ones, before potentially extending it in ways to incorporate the more complex features discussed in the
last few paragraphs.
3. Data and Preliminary Tests
3.1. Data.
3.1.1. Sources and Frequency. We employ standard time series that are common in Taylor rule estima-
tion. However, we also make use of a few alternative proxies for the explanatory variables, which are of
particular relevance for the UK.
All data were downloaded from the statistical pages on the websites of the UK Oﬃce of National
Statistics (ONS) and the Bank of England (BoE).
As mentioned, we work here with quarterly frequency. This certainly makes our subsamples smaller
than if we had recurred to monthly time series. Yet our quarterly estimates turned out most of the
time to be both significant in econometric terms and interpretable in economic terms. This is in part
because, as Clarida-Galí-Gertler (1997, 1998 a, b, 2000) and Nelson (2000, 2001, 2003) have pointed out
with respect to their earlier and similar estimations, the variability of the data involved is suﬃcient to
produce reasonable results even in relatively small samples.
3.1.2. Variable Proxies.
Nominal Short-Term Interest Rate. Following most other previous Taylor rule papers on the UK, in
particular Nelson (2000, 2001, 2003) and Martin and Milas (2004), we assume that the short-term
interest rate supposed to be the operating instrument of the Bank of England is best proxied by the 3-
month Treasury bill rate. This is not quite precise, because since operational independence the Bank has
been using the 2-week repo rate as its policy instrument. Yet the latter rate has been relatively recently
introduced, i.e., in May 1997. As Nelson (2000, 2001, 2003) points out, the advantage of the 3-month
Treasury bill rate is that, being very close to the various diﬀerent rates — four in total since the early
1970s — that have played the role of operating instrument,13 it can be used, for greater comparability and
with no much loss of precision, to approximate all of them when longer periods of study are of interest
(see figures 1 and 2 in Appendix A).
Inflation. Inflation is proxied in our study by two alternative indexes that are usual choices when working
with UK data:
• the Retail Price Index (RPI), as in Martin and Milas (2004) and Kesriyeli, Osborn and Sensier
(2004), among others; and
13Including also — in addition to the currently used repo rate — the bank rate (through September 1972), the minimum
lending rate (October 1972 - July 1981) and the minimum band 1 dealing rate (August 1981 - April 1997).
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• the same Retail Price Index but eXcluding the mortgage rate (RPIX),14 as, for instance, in
Nelson (2000, 2001, 2003).
The RPIX has been the oﬃcially announced measure of UK inflation and guide for UK monetary
policy in the period 1992-2003, and the RPI has performed that same role before 1992 (see Figure 3,
which documents the high correlation between these two price level indexes, and Figure 5, which presents
the two respective inflation measures before and after operational independence). As for the consumer
price index (CPI), which is the standard measure of inflation in most other economies, including for the
purposes of monetary policy, it has become the oﬃcial index accounting for the evolution of the UK
general price level only since 2004, and has in this way precluded any possibility to use it in our study.
Output Gap. Our measure for the output gap is, alternatively, constructed out of two available time
series:
• the final or revised data for real GDP, as in the majority of studies on Taylor rules; and
• the real-time or initially released data for the same variable, real GDP, which have been available
to policy makers ‘in real time’, that is, at the time of making decisions on monetary policy: more
precisely, we use the series constructed by Nelson and Nikolov (2001) and accessible on the
Bank of England’s website (see Figure 4, which documents another high correlation, this time
between our two UK output level proxies, as well as Figure 6, which compares their growth rates
before and after operational independence). In a series of papers, Orphanides (1998, 2000, 2001,
2003) first argued that real-time data, in addition to being more realistic, may overturn some
conclusions about feedback rules based on final data.
Moreover, each of these two types of real GDP series has been filtered by two now standard (although
not perfect) procedures to obtain a measure for the output gap, namely:
• by fitting a quadratic trend, as in Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1997, 1998 a, b, 2000) and Nelson
(2000, 2001, 2003), among others; and
• by a Hodrick-Prescott detrending (with a smoothing parameter equal to 1600, as recommended
for quarterly data), as in Martin and Milas (2004) and Kesriyeli, Osborn and Sensier (2004),
among others.
Both of these methods to obtain an output gap measure have, of course, their advantages and short-
comings. For this reason, and also to arrive at results that are not necessarily sensitive to the detrending
employed, we have preferred to work with both filtering procedures, as reported further down (see figures
7 and 8).
3.1.3. Graphs and Descriptive Statistics. Graphs — figures 1 through 8 — illustrating the dynamics of our
data as well as tables with descriptive statistics for the two periods of interest in the present study, pre-
independence inflation targeting (1992:4-1997:1) in Panel A of Table 1 and post-independence inflation
targeting (1997:3-2004:4) in Panel B of Table 1, are included in Appendix A.
3.2. Preliminary Tests.
3.2.1. Seasonality Tests. Information contained in the files downloaded from the sources of our data, the
ONS and the BoE, indicated certain inconsistency of the time series we wished to employ in the Taylor
rule estimations with respect to their seasonal adjustment. More precisely, nominal GDP data and the
GDP deflator — hence, real GDP, by construction — were provided at their source as seasonally adjusted
(sa), whereas both price levels, the RPI and the RPIX, as well as the 3-month Treasury bill rate were
not seasonally adjusted (nsa).
We thus performed Census X12 seasonality tests with all these series. As was expected, the real
GDP data were not found to display seasonality while for the price level and interest rate data it was
definitely confirmed that they followed a seasonal pattern.15 Consequently, we performed two versions
of our Taylor rule regressions:
• with the raw data, as they were from their sources, i.e., with no seasonal adjustment to the RPI,
the RPIX and the 3-month Treasury bill rate; and
• with seasonally adjusted — by the Census X12 procedure — respective price levels (denoted in our
tables in Appendix A as RPISA and RPIXSA) and interest rate.
14The main reason for this exclusion has been claimed to be that the mortgage rate tends to move closely with the
Bank of England’s instrument.
15Detailed results from our seasonality tests are available upon request.
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We did so because of certain criticisms in the sense that deseasonalization techniques may diminish or
eliminate important features of the raw time series and thus give rise to findings which do not necessarily
reflect genuine correlations across the data. On the other hand, it seemed to us somewhat inconsistent
not to employ seasonally adjusted prices and interest rates side by side with real GDP data that were
anyway seasonally adjusted at the source. This is why we later on report both type of results (nsa and
sa).
3.2.2. Stationarity Tests. Another typical preliminary procedure in time series analysis is to test for
(non)stationarity of the variables entering the regressions. By the way, in the particular case of Taylor
rule estimation, this has not been systematically done in most of the previous literature, as Gerlach-
Kristen (2003) has duly pointed out.
We followed her critique and tested our variables for (non)stationarity, applying three standard unit
root tests, each one in four alternative specifications. More precisely, we performed Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) unit root tests based on autoregressive models in parallel with kernel-based Phillips-Perron
(PP) unit root tests, with the null for both tests being that of a unit root (i.e., nonstationarity) present.
These two tests were further supplemented by a test constructed on the opposite null, of stationarity,
namely the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test, and both autoregressive and kernel-based
specifications of it were used.16
We generally found that the price levels, RPI and RPIX, could be either I(1) or I(2). Hence, inflation
could be either stationary or not, depending on the chosen proxy and test. The 3-month Treasury bill rate
and the real GDP gap obtained from quadratic-trend fitting cannot be treated with certainty neither as
definitely stationary nor as definitely I(1) variables either, because of mixed findings from the alternative
unit root tests and specifications within each test we resorted to. Only the real GDP gap obtained from
Hodrick-Prescott detrending appeared to be most likely I(0). Having found no overwhelming evidence
that the variables which — according to the theory — should enter our Taylor rule equations were integrated
of the same order, we thus also avoided any idea for estimation based on the cointegration approach, as
recently done in a similar study for the euro area by Gerlach-Kristen (2003).
With (i) such a heterogeneity in the likely order of integration of our time series and (ii) bearing
in mind as well the notorious low power of unit root tests, in particular in short samples like ours, we
ultimately followed the New Keynesian theory of monetary policy and performed Taylor rule estimation
in the standard way, as also argued and done recently by Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1997, 1998 a, b,
2000). These authors defend the key assumptions in their work — stationarity of inflation and the nominal
interest rate, as we shall also assume here — by stressing that they are both empirically and theoretically
plausible.
What we could do, and what we did, in fact, to at least partly address or mitigate the problem in
question and hopefully obtain somewhat better results, of a greater robustness and of a higher generality,
is that we used three alternative methods of estimation and a number of econometric specifications within
each method. We then looked for results that are generalizable to a high extent, i.e., such that hold
across most of the performed regressions. We discuss in the next section our estimation strategies
and specification choices, by also linking them to the previous literature and motivating our preferred
approaches.
4. Estimation Methods, Specifications Estimated and Key Findings
Our overall empirical strategy was to apply the most common and appropriate techniques used by now
in similar Taylor rule studies. These techniques relate to ordinary least squares (OLS), in the earliest
literature, and to two-stage least squares (TSLS) and the generalized method of moments (GMM), in
the more recent papers. Another objective we pursued was to begin from the simple and most natural
specifications, including the original rule by Taylor (1993), and move to the more complicated Taylor
rule versions and econometrically better suited and justified techniques, thus basically following the
chronology in which the literature evolved. We therefore started with a logical point of departure, by
estimating the original Taylor rule (in a few versions). Tests for structural breaks were then performed
on it as well, essentially to check the validity of our split of the sample in two subperiods. Yet for
theoretical and econometric reasons we duly make clear further down, we focus on, and give most weight
16Detailed results from our stationarity tests are available upon request.
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to, our findings when subsequently employing the GMM approach to estimating forward-looking Taylor
rules popularized by Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1997, 1998 a, b, 2000).17
We already said in the beginning that our paper diﬀers from most preceding ones on similar issues in
two aspects. First, our topic is operational independence of the Bank of England since mid-1997 and what
its introduction has changed, if at all, in the perception — if not in the implementation itself — of monetary
policy as recovered from the data, that is, by employing Taylor rules. To the best of our knowledge, the
present study is the first to address this important question, of increased central bank independence, in
an inflation targeting framework. Second, having recurred to a wide variety of econometric methods and
regression specifications and having thus obtained a diversity of numerical measures on the key coeﬃcients
of interest — interpreted in the literature as the reaction of the monetary authorities to inflation and
to the output gap and the degree of interest rate smoothing — we then look out for, and stress, certain
generally valid results, i.e., those that survive across most methods and specifications implemented in
terms of (i) statistical significance, (ii) theoretically correct sign and (iii) reasonable and economically
interpretable (range of) magnitude of the above-enumerated policy response parameters. It is true that
the greater the number of techniques and specifications an econometrician tries, the less is the chance for
some general patterns to be uncovered in the ‘forest of numbers’. Nevertheless, we are able to identify
results whose substance withstands all employed methods and regression variants and lends itself to a
reasonable and insightful interpretation. The import of the present paper is to point out to a few such
novel findings, on which we elaborate in more detail further down.
4.1. Ordinary Least Squares: Classic and Backward-Looking Taylor Rules. As a first bench-
mark — and to follow some sort of chronology or, rather, logic — we begin by reporting regression output
from the straightforward, original Taylor rule and the simplest of the econometric methods applied,
OLS. In what follows we then (i) extend the classic Taylor rule in several directions recommended in the
literature and (ii) improve on estimation by adding results obtained through TSLS and GMM, with a
considerable diversity of alternative reaction function specifications and variable proxies. As noted, we
place a predominant weight on our GMM results. Yet our general findings are not so method-specific,
and can be — in part — detected even by less sophisticated feedback rules and econometric techniques.
This is another reason to start by the simpler.
4.1.1. Point of Departure: The Original (or Classic) Taylor Rule. We estimated the Taylor (1993) rule
on UK quarterly data for our two subsamples, in both its original specification (2.4), with πT = 2.5
as most appropriate for our particular country case and time period, and classic version (2.5), i.e.,
transformed without a constant inflation target inside the inflation gap variable in the RHS. We present
our results in the first pair of columns in Table 2 in Appendix A. As pointed out in section 2, the only
diﬀerence in the estimated coeﬃcients is in the intercept term (iT vs b0,0). This intercept could be more
directly interpreted in the original Taylor rule, (2.4), in the sense of being the desired nominal interest
rate, iT . We find a statistically significant and economically reasonable magnitude for this NIR target
in both subsamples: 5.76% (with Hodrick-Prescott detrending) to 5.77% (with quadratic detrending)
p.a. during pre-independence and 4.95% (with quadratic detrending) to 5.01% (with Hodrick-Prescott
detrending) p.a. during pre-independence. iT is itself the sum of the (constant) ‘equilibrium’ real interest
rate, r∗, and the (constant) inflation target, πT = 2.5. Our measure of iT thus implies, for πT = 2.5, a
corresponding measure of the equilibrium real rate of interest, r∗ ≡ iT−πT : 3.25% p.a. pre-independence
and 2.50% p.a. post-independence, both values making good economic sense with view to the British
circumstances.
The first thing we would like to stress here is that the original Taylor rule performs in an impressive
manner during our post-independence subsample. All variables (i) are statistically significant at all
conventional levels and have (ii) the expected (from theory) sign and (iii) magnitudes that seem quite
reasonable and completely interpretable. Moreover, the coeﬃcients bπ,0 and bx,0 are found practically
the same, 0.85, as Taylor (1993) argued (however, he quantified them both at 0.5 instead). The only
major problem with the regression results in Table 2 is serial correlation (reflected in the value of the
17Another recent estimation technique, which we do not pursue here, was implemented by Muscatelli, Tirelli and
Trecroci (2000). They apply the structural time series (STS) approach proposed by Harvey (1989) to generate series of
the expected inflation rate and output gap. By contrast, the Clarida-Galí-Gertler (1997, 1998 a, b, 2000) GMM approach
essentially consists in using the errors-in-variables method to model rational expectations: in it, instead of forecasting
inflation and output — e.g., by Kalman filter methods, as in Muscatelli-Tirelli-Trecroci (2000) — future actual values replace
as regressors expected values, as we explain in more detail later on.
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Durbin-Watson statistics). In the pre-independence subsample another problem seems to be that the
output gap is statistically indistinguishable from zero, no matter which measure we use for it.
The second point we would like to make is that, however, this latter result does not seem too surprising
in light of our findings — of a similar spirit although not exactly the same — when using more complicated
Taylor rule specifications and more sophisticated econometric techniques, as reported further down. One
interpretation may be in the sense that the Bank of England has not (systematically) considered the
output gap in designing its monetary policy during 1992-1997 but has (consistently) reacted to it, as well
as to inflation, during 1997-2004. Moreover, the coeﬃcients on inflation do not unambiguously indicate
that the response to it by the BoE has increased or decreased in magnitude in the post-independence
period relative to the pre-independence one. We return with more analysis and a plausible interpretation
to these initial findings in the later parts of the present section.
A third point is that, as is well-known from the related literature, Taylor rule equations in the original
version often suﬀer from serial correlation. In our case, Lagrange multiplier Breusch-Godrfrey tests, in
addition to the Durbin-Watson one, have established a likely positive autocorrelation of the residuals of
the regression of order 1. When an AR(1) correction in the error process is introduced in the equation
we estimated, with no any other modification, our results do not change qualitatively (although in
quantitative terms policy responses are twice weaker), as can be seen in the second pair of columns in
Table 2.
4.1.2. Structural Break Tests. To check for structural breaks in (and, more generally, out of) our sample
and, in essence, to confirm econometrically the choice of our sample split, quarter 2 in 1997, suggested by
the narrative evidence reported below, we performed Chow breakpoint and forecast tests on the classic
Taylor rule (2.5). The dates we selected for the tests are potentially the most likely ones to have resulted
in structural instability in UK monetary policy throughout the 1990s and until 2004. All of these changes
in monetary regime have been implemented following oﬃcial public announcements, as also discussed by
Nelson (2000, 2001, 2003), among others. These changes in policy can thus be considered as (largely)
exogenous. The associated dates of their (approximate) perception as public knowledge, for which we
have run the two mentioned Chow tests, are the following.
(1) Membership of the British sterling in the Exchange-Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European
Community, as from October 1990.
(2) Sterling crisis and suspension of the ERM in the UK, in September 1992, followed by the in-
stauration of an inflation(-forecast) targeting framework for monetary policy as from October
1992.
(3) Target inflation reformulated from a target band (or range) of 1% to 4% (implying a mid-point
of 2.5% p.a.) to an explicit medium-term point target of 2.5% p.a. — as reported, for instance,
in Martin and Milas (2004), p. 210, and, in more detail, in Haldane (1995) — but defined in an
asymmetrical way (our next paragraph clarifies what this means).
(4) The Bank of England granted operational independence from HM Treasury in May 1997, and in
June 1997 the 2.5% point target announced to become symmetrical : i.e., to give equal weight to
circumstances in which inflation is higher or lower than the target rate; in other words, inflation
below the target was to be judged as being just as bad as inflation above the target.18
(5) In December 2003, target inflation lowered from 2.5% p.a. to 2% p.a., and expressed as from
January 2004 in terms of the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), renamed (again in
December 2003) to simply the Consumer Price Index (CPI), instead of in terms of the RPIX (as
it had been during the 1992-2003 period).
With view to this narrative account of the evolution of the framework for monetary policy in the UK
provided by the Bank of England, a competent and credible source of primary information, we would
argue that: (i) there has been no considerable change from the point when we break our sample in two
subsamples, namely the second quarter of 1997 (itself excluded from our estimation), when the Bank
of England was granted operational independence, until (almost) the end of our sample; the only other
major change of a similar magnitude is the break point, namely the third quarter of 1992 (also excluded
from our estimation), after which our sample starts with the introduction of inflation targeting. The
above policy narrative was nevertheless subjected to formal econometric tests, which took into account
all other enumerated potential changes in regime. The breakpoint and forecast Chow tests we performed
18The motivation behind this particular policy target modification is explained by the Bank of England (see website)
in the following way: ”The new target of 2.5% was quite a significant change from the previous target of 2.5% or less. The
Treasury felt there were uncertainties about the old target — was it 2.5% or less than 2.5%, and if so how much less?”.
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confirmed what we already expected. As can be seen in Panel A (with RPI and final real GDP gap data)
and Panel B (with RPIX and final real GDP gap data) of Table 3, the structural breaks delimiting our
sample are the two out of the five tested that are most supported by our data. More precisely, in 6 out
of all 8 test statistic probability values with RPI data and, again, in 6 out of all 8 with RPIX data, we
reject the null of no structural break at the 5% significance level.19 We, therefore, continued to estimate
over our two subsamples and to compare the results across them.
4.1.3. Backward-Looking Taylor Rules. A way to address the problems of endogeneity and, potentially,
serial correlation usually encountered in original Taylor rule equations while still applying the OLS
method is to estimate them with all regressors lagged and by also adding an additional lagged dependent
variable. As we have discussed in section 2, such backward-looking Taylor rules may have diﬀerent lag
length. Yet most papers have found that lags of 1 or 2 are usually suﬃcient to capture the dynamics of
such equations. Another common finding has been that backward-looking Taylor rules are problematic
in terms of econometric output, in addition to the problems with theoretical underpinnings. This is what
we would like to also confirm here, with our results based on UK most recent data.
Following Nelson (2000, 2001, 2003), we estimated a backward-looking Taylor rule where all variables
enter with lag 1. The results — see Table 4 — are poor and do not lend themselves to a sensible economic
interpretation, apart perhaps one: such backward-looking specifications could be discarded from further
attention on both economic and econometric grounds.
Again trying the exercise Nelson (2000, 2001, 2003) performed, we reestimated with two lags for all
variables and then progressively eliminated the insignificant terms. We could not arrive, however, at
any reasonable parsimonious backward-looking Taylor rule, which is supportive of what we have just
concluded.
4.2. Two-Stage Least Squares: Classic and Backward-Looking Taylor Rules. A second way to
address the problems of endogeneity and, potentially, serial correlation in classic Taylor rule equations
is to replace OLS by TSLS. That is what we did next.
4.2.1. The Original (or Classic) Taylor Rule Again. Our TSLS results enhanced, as a matter of fact,
those from the OLS estimation reported above. Table 5 indicates that there is no any important dif-
ference in our conclusions, even in a quantitative aspect. First, such equations for the UK in the
post-independence period of inflation targeting perform amazingly well and can be sensibly interpreted,
similarly to the case of the original Taylor (1993) article. Second, they suggest that the output gap has
not mattered before operational independence but has mattered afterwards, even more than inflation, if
we judge by the magnitude of the respective coeﬃcient estimates.
4.2.2. Backward-Looking Taylor Rules Again. Our TSLS estimation also confirmed what the OLS method
had found earlier concerning backward -looking Taylor rules. That is why we end up by concluding that
the poor performance of such equations is most likely due not to the econometric approach implemented
but rather to their problematic justifiability from the perspective of economic theory. We, therefore, leave
them aside as economically irrelevant (and econometrically weak) and turn next in greater detail to the
theory behind forward -looking Taylor rules and to our results from estimating alternative specifications
of such policy reaction functions.
4.3. Generalized Method of Moments: Forward-Looking Taylor Rules. In this paper, we es-
sentially focus on the strategy of estimating forward-looking Taylor rules popularized by Clarida, Galí
and Gertler (1997, 1998 a, b, 2000). Since the Clarida-Galí-Gertler approach also provides a solid theo-
retical rationale for our empirical work here, it is summarized next, using the less ambiguous notation
we introduced.
19It is true that there is also strong evidence for another structural change, in 1995:2: in 6 out of all 8 test statistic
probability values with RPI data and in 5 out of all 8 with RPIX data we reject the null of no structural break. Yet we
cannot split our pre-independence subsample into two additional subsamples, as the number of observations will be only
about 10 or less in each. The fifth potential break, in 2004:1, is definitely discarded by our Chow tests. The test results for
the first potential break, in 1990:4 (outside the sample of interest to us here), are rather mixed; overall, however, rejection
findings on the null of no structural change dominate, so there is good reason to accept a break in 1990:4 as well, based on
both econometric and descriptive evidence.
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4.3.1. Theoretical Rationale for Our Forward-Looking Specifications. It is by now standard to think of
monetary policy reaction functions in general, and of Taylor rules in particular, as if derived from an
underlying model of the economy. This model is usually the baseline New Keynesian model described in
King and Woolman (1996 a, b) and Yun (1996), among others, and also called — first by Goodfriend and
King (1997) and in a broader context — the New Neoclassical Synthesis (NNS) model. It is not necessary
for our purposes here to fully write down this model, as such sticky-price analytical frameworks have
been well explored.20 We would rather sketch its relevance to our estimation below, by simply stating its
‘core’ equations and then relating them to the forward-looking feedback rules we estimated by applying
GMM.
After log-linearization around a zero inflation steady state, the equilibrium conditions of the baseline
New Keynesian (or NNS) model are embodied in four equations, which — following Clarida, Galí and
Gertler (2000) in ignoring certain constant terms, but using our notation here — can be written as:
(4.1) πt = δE [πt+1 | It] + λ (yt − ξt) ,
(4.2) yt = E [yt+1 | It]− 1σ (it −E [πt+1 | It]) + ζt,
(4.3) iTt = βπ,+1E [πt+1 | It] + βx,0xt,
(4.4) it = βi,−1it−1 +
¡
1− βi,−1
¢
iTt .
Equation (4.1) is a (New Keynesian) forward-looking Phillips curve, or also alternatively termed a
(New Keynesian) forward-looking aggregate supply (AS) curve. It is the information set available at
time t. δ is the discount factor and λ the output elasticity of inflation. yt ≡ lnYt is the current-period
level of output and ξt is the natural rate of output, defined as the level of output that would obtain
under fully flexible prices and assumed to follow an AR(1) process. This AS curve can be derived by
aggregation of optimal price-setting decisions by monopolistically competitive firms under Calvo (1983)
individual price adjustment.
(4.2) is interpreted as a (New Keynesian) forward-looking IS curve, and is derived as a combination
of a standard consumption Euler equation and a market clearing condition. σ denotes the coeﬃcient of
relative risk aversion (CRRA) embedded in the utility function. ζt is in this context usually interpreted
as an exogenous demand shock: like ξt in the aggregate supply curve (4.1), it is assumed to follow an
AR(1) process.
Equation (4.3) is a (New Keynesian) forward-looking monetary policy rule of the usual Taylor type.
(4.4), finally, is a (New Keynesian) interest rate smoothing equation.
In our notation, all policy parameters are easily recognized by the β-letter: each subscript to it consists
of a pair of symbols, the first being the respective letter designating the variable to which the β-coeﬃcient
relates and the second being a positive or negative integer denoting the respective lead (+) or lag (−),
with 0 standing for the current period. We use this notation further down in the text and tables for a
clearer reference.
Following the above New Keynesian approach, one can summarize the policy of the central bank by
a linear instrument rule of the Taylor type and with forward-looking formation of rational expectations:
(4.5) iTt = i
T + βπ,+k
¡
E [πt+k | It]− πT
¢
+ βx,+qE [xt+q | It] ,
where, as noted, It is the information set available to the monetary authority at the time the interest
rate is set. By construction, iT is the desired (constant) nominal interest rate when inflation is at its
target level and output is at potential. (4.5) is the empirical counterpart of (4.3) above. Clarida-Galí-
Gertler (1997, 1998 a, b, 2000) claim in a series of articles that such a monetary policy reaction function
has some appeal on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Theoretically, approximate forms of rules
like (4.3) are optimal if the monetary authority has as objective a quadratic loss function in deviations
of inflation and output from their respective targets in the context of the New Keynesian macromodel
we have just outlined. Empirically, rules like (4.5) usually provide a reasonably good summary of most
central banks’ behavior in recent years.
20An excellent textbook source is Woodford (2003)
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Adding and subtracting E [πt+k | It]− πT to the RHS of (4.5),
iTt = i
T + βπ,+k
¡
E [πt+k | It]− πT
¢
+
+βx,+qE [xt+q | It] +
¡
E [πt+k | It]− πT
¢
−
¡
E [πt+k | It]− πT
¢
,
and rearranging,
iTt −E [πt+k | It]| {z }
≡rTt,+k
= iT + βπ,+k
¡
E [πt+k | It]− πT
¢
+
+βx,+qE [xt+q | It]− πT −
¡
E [πt+k | It]− πT
¢
,
implies an ex ante real interest rate target that can be written as:
(4.6) rTt,+k =
¡
iT − πT
¢| {z }
≡r∗=const
+ (βπ,+k − 1)
¡
E [πt+k | It]− πT
¢
+ βx,+qE [xt+q | It] .
Clarida-Galí-Gertler (1998 b, 2000) point to the insights embodied in (4.6); it clearly shows that (i)
attaining the target ‘on average’ and assuming that the real interest rate is determined by non-monetary
factors in the long run implies a constraint on iT which should be set equal to the exogenously given long-
term ‘equilibrium’ real interest rate r∗ plus the inflation target πT ; (ii) interest rate rules characterized
by βπ > 1 and βx > 0 will tend to be stabilizing, to the extent that lower real interest rates boost
economic activity but also inflation, while those with βπ < 1 and βx < 0 will tend to be destabilizing.
Incorporating interest rate smoothing behavior, widely supported by the practice of central banks as
well as from a theoretical perspective, and allowing for exogenous interest rate (i.e., here also monetary
policy) shocks requires an extension of the interest rate target (4.5) by also specifying a model for the
actual interest rate:
(4.7) it = βi (L) it−1 +
¡
1− βi,−1
¢
iTt + νt.
In (4.7), L denotes the lag operator, βi (L) ≡ βi,−1 + βi,−2L1 + ... + βi,−nLn−1 with βi,−1 ∈ [0, 1)
measures the degree of smoothing of interest rate changes and νt is a zero mean exogenous interest rate
shock. (4.7) is, in turn, the empirical counterpart of (4.4) above.
Plugging the Taylor rule target (4.5) into the partial adjustment model (4.7),
(4.8) it = βi (L) it−1+
+
¡
1− βi,−1
¢ ©
iT + βπ,+k
¡
E [πt+k | It]− πT
¢
+ βx,+qE [xt+q | It]
ª
+ νt,
representing the expected values, E [πt+k | It] and E [xt+q | It] , respectively, as realized values minus
forecast errors, πt+k − (πt+k −E [πt+k | It]) and xt+q − (xt+q −E [xt+q | It]), respectively,
it = βi (L) it−1 +
¡
1− βi,−1
¢×
×©iT + βπ,+k ¡[πt+k − (πt+k −E [πt+k | It])]− πT ¢+ βx,+q [xt+q − (xt+q −E [xt+q | It])]ª+ νt,
and rearranging, yields an equation for the actual (not target) nominal interest rate of the form
(4.9) it =
¡
1− βi,−1
¢⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
£
r∗ −
¡
βπ,+k − 1
¢
πT
¤| {z }
≡β0,+k
+ βπ,+kπt+k + βx,+qxt+q
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎭
+ βi (L)| {z }
≡βi,−1
it−1 + εt,
where
(4.10) εt ≡ −
¡
1− βi,−1
¢ ©
βπ,+k (πt+k −E [πt+k | It]) + βx,+q (xt+q −E [xt+q | It])
ª
+ νt.
It can be seen in (4.10) that εt is a linear combination of forecast errors of inflation and the output gap
(the term in curly brackets) and the exogenous disturbance to the interest rate, νt: it is thus orthogonal
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to any variable in the information set It available at time t. Now let zt denote a vector of variables
within the central bank’s information set at the time when the decision on the interest rate is made,
that is, zt ∈ It. As Clarida-Galí-Gertler (1998 b), p. 1039, suggest, possible elements of zt (and,
thus, instruments in the econometric sense) include any lagged variables that help forecast inflation and
output, as well as any contemporaneous variables that are uncorrelated with the current-period interest
rate shock νt. Since E [εt | zt] = 0, (4.9) then implies the set of orthogonality conditions
(4.11)
E
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
it −
¡
1− βi,−1
¢⎛⎜⎜⎝£r∗ − ¡βπ,+k − 1¢πT ¤| {z }
≡β0,+k
+ βπ,+kπt+k + βx,+qxt+q
⎞
⎟⎟⎠− βi (L) it−1
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
zt
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ = 0.
These orthogonality conditions provide the basis for the estimation of the parameters of interest,
collected in the vector β0 ≡
¡
β0,+k, βπ,+k, βx,+q, βi,−1
¢0
, applying the Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM) first suggested by Hansen (1982). Standard errors were calculated on the basis of the delta
method, as described in detail in Appendix B. Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998 b, 2000) note that, by
construction, the first component of {εt} follows anMA(a) process, with a = max {k, q}−1 and will thus
be serially correlated unless k = q = 1. For that reason, the GMM estimation should be carried out with
a weighting matrix that is robust to autocorrelation (and heteroskedasticity), as we also do. Moreover,
to the extent that the dimension of vector zt is higher than the number of parameters to estimate, 4
in our case here, (4.11) implies some over identifying restrictions that can be tested in order to assess
the validity of the specification estimated as well as the set of instruments used. We present such test
statistics in the tables of results reported in Appendix A and discussed further down. The test rests on
the following logic, as exposed in Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998 b), pp. 1040-1041. Under the null, the
central bank adjusts the interest rate each period so that (4.8) holds, with the RHS expectations based
on all relevant information available to policymakers at that time (which includes it itself, since expected
inflation and output will not be invariant to it). With the Clarida-Galí-Gertler assumptions, of which
we also make use here, that implies the existence of values for the vector β such that the residual εt is
orthogonal to the variables in the information set It. Under the alternative, the central bank adjusts
the interest rate in response to changes in some current and/or lagged variables, but not necessarily
in connection with the information that those changes contain about future inflation and output. In
that case, some relevant explanatory variables are being omitted from (4.9). To the extent that some of
those variables are correlated with the instruments zt, the set of orthogonality conditions (4.11) will be
violated, which would lead to a statistical rejection of the model (given a suﬃciently large sample).
4.3.2. Summary of Estimates of Forward-Looking Taylor Rules. Let us now look in more detail at our
key results from estimating forward-looking Taylor rules via GMM. We have estimated specifications
where the lead for inflation varies from 1 to 8 quarters ahead, k = 1, ..., 8, and that for the output gap
from 0 to 4, q = 0, ..., 4. For the output gap, both final (or revised) and real-time (or initial) GDP data
have been used and specifications with both quadratic and Hodrick-Prescott filtering to obtain the output
gap have been estimated. For the price level, underlying the definition of inflation, both the RPI and the
RPIX have been alternatively employed. Moreover, the RPI, the RPIX and the 3-month Treasury bill
enter our various specifications either as they were released from the original data sources and thus not
seasonally adjusted (nsa) or seasonally adjusted (sa) by the Census X12 procedure. All these numerous
estimates are summarized in the tables collected in Appendix A, which we briefly discuss next.21
Panels A and B in Table 6 compare the coeﬃcients of interest here from an identical forward-looking
Taylor rule estimated over the pre- and post-independence subsamples, respectively, using the RPI to
calculate inflation and both final and real-time GDP gap data. Panels A and B in Table 7 do the same for
the RPIX instead; we now report results only for the real-time GDP gap series, since when revised GDP
data were used the regressions were not easily interpretable. Tables 8 and 9 report our corresponding
estimates when the price level used to define inflation and the 3-month Treasury bill rate have first been
deseasonalized before entering the regressions.
The leads of k = 2, 3 for inflation and of q = 0, 1 for the output gap were selected as the preferred ones
across all attempted specifications from the viewpoint of both econometrics and economics. In the former
case, the econometric characteristics of the regressions such as statistical significance of most relevant
parameters, higher adjusted R-squared, lower standard error of regression (SER) and higher probability
21All other details, including the data files and the EViews programs, are available upon request.
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value of the Hansen J-test for the validity of overidentifying restrictions have mattered overall. In the
latter case, the signs and magnitudes of the statistically significant monetary policy feedback coeﬃcients
to inflation and to the output gap and the value of the interest rate smoothing parameter have been
selected across our multiple specifications so as to make most economic sense and to allow reasonable
interpretation. As can be verified in the last row of tables 6 and 7, the validity of our overidentifying
restrictions and of the set of our instruments cannot be rejected for all equations we report and the
goodness of fit is also very high (especially for the second, later subsample, perhaps partly because of
the greater number of observations). Then, the coeﬃcients of interest are statistically significant at all
conventional levels in all specifications. Moreover, the positive expected signs of the response to both
inflation and the output gap and the bounds between 0 and 1 of the smoothing parameter are always and
everywhere (in the 16 specifications on which we focus attention here) satisfied. The respective tables
with seasonally adjusted price level and interest rate, 8 and 9, are not that perfect econometrically.
Finally, we look into the magnitudes of the reaction coeﬃcients. We would like to stress, in partic-
ular, the numerical ranges obtained with RPIX (nsa) and real-time GDP data (i.e., Table 7), mostly
because such were the data of relevance and at the disposal to the monetary authority when making
policy decisions reflected in changes in the interest rate. However, discussing any of the other reported
specifications (in Table 6 as well as in most other tables in Appendix A) will not substantially modify
the quantitative essence of our major findings. These are as follows.
Reaction to Inflation. To begin with, and what appeared to us at first sight surprising, is that most
reported estimates confirm that the positive magnitude of the coeﬃcient to inflation has declined (or
even become in some specifications statistically insignificant) in the post-independence subsample relative
to the pre-independence one.
In Table 6, for example, where the RPI is used to calculate inflation, βπ,+2 has dropped from 1.09 in
the pre-independence subsample to 0.48 in the post-independence one if quadratic detrending of real-time
real GDP is used to obtain the gap measure, or from 0.91 to 0.73 if Hodrick-Prescott filtering is applied
instead. If we take the corresponding results with seasonally adjusted RPI and interest rate in Table 8,
the quadratic specification shows again a drop from 0.80 to 0.61 yet the Hodrick-Prescott one results in
a rise from 0.71 to 0.91.
Looking now at the same results but when the RPIX is used instead to compute the rate of inflation, as
reported in the last two columns of Table 7, the quadratic specification indicates a (relatively) moderate
fall of βπ,+2 from 0.67 to 0.50 and the Hodrick-Prescott one from 0.81 to 0.50 (and, moreover, the
corresponding reduced-form coeﬃcient, bπ,+2, is marginally insignificant at the 10% level). If we take
the respective results with seasonally adjusted RPIX and 3-month Treasury bill rate in Table 9, these
conclusions are now reversed: the quadratic specification shows a (relatively) sharp rise from 0.10 to 0.59
and the Hodrick-Prescott one from 0.89 to 2.32. If one considers, in turn, the first pair of columns in
Table 7, where the inflation lead (again, RPIX-based) is specified at 3 instead of 2 quarters, the quadratic
version registers similarly a fall of βπ,+3 from 1.45 to 1.07 but the Hodrick-Prescott version now shows
a considerable rise from 1.01 to 1.83. No matter the disparity, it is worth noting here that all four
policy responses to inflation estimated on RPIX-lead of 3 quarters and current-period real-time GDP
gap are consistent in quantitative terms with the theoretically expected values of above 1. In this sense,
these could represent our ‘most reasonable’ quantification of Bank of England’s feedback to inflation.
The magnitudes are close to what Nelson (2001), p. 20, tables 5 and 6, reported, 1.27, as his preferred
estimate for the pre-independence inflation targeting subsample.22 On the other hand, Clarida, Galí and
Gertler (1998 b), p. 1055, Table 4, come up with an inflation response estimate for their 1979:06-1990:10
monthly British sample marginally lower than unity, namely 0.98, which is more in line with most of the
estimates we reported above.23
Thus, our findings on the reaction of the UK monetary authorities to inflation before and after
operational independence are somewhat sensitive to the data and specifications used and, therefore,
inconclusive. If one can justify that (i) real-time GDP data matter and not final ones, (ii) RPIX is
more relevant throughout our sample period than RPI, and (iii) for consistency with the other variables
entering the Taylor rule regressions, prices and interest rates should be seasonally adjusted, a stronger
22For this last subsample of quarterly data in his study, coinciding exactly with our pre-independence inflation targeting
subsample, Nelson (2001), p. 20, Table 5, estimates via TSLS Bank of England’s response to the output gap at 0.47 and
interest rate smoothing coeﬃcient at 0.29.
23For their sample, earlier than ours and containing shifts in monetary regime, Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998 b),
p. 1055, Table 4, quantify via GMM Bank of England’s response to the output gap at 0.19 and interest rate smoothing
coeﬃcient at 0.92.
HAS MORE INDEPENDENCE AFFECTED BANK OF ENGLAND’S REACTION FUNCTION? 21
response to inflation in the post-independence period by the Bank of England is what our estimates
largely confirm. Yet if one of these conditions is not well-substantiated, it may well be that the reaction
to inflation has been weakened relative to pre-independence inflation targeting.
Interest Rate Smoothing. In a similar way, we cannot say much as to whether the degree of interest rate
smoothing, reflected in our estimates for the coeﬃcient, bi,−1, has become stronger or weaker after the
Bank of England was granted operational independence from HM Treasury in May 1997. Evidently,
any conclusion in this sense would rest on a restrictive interpretation of a subset of our Taylor rule
specifications and alternative proxies, which we would not wish to force on the data. It might also well
be that, with respect to both inflation and interest rate smoothing, the post-independence behavior of
the UK monetary authority has not changed much, if at all, and for that reason cannot be definitely
detected and confirmed by our data.
Reaction to the Output Gap. Yet if our results on the reaction of the Bank of England to inflation
and on its approach to interest rate smoothing cannot lead to any well-grounded conclusion, the more
so in a quantitative context, we believe that the contribution of the present empirical work is mostly
in uncovering an initially unexpected but after all logically interpretable central bank response to the
output gap, fully consistent with an inflation targeting strategy given the stage in the business cycle.
We elaborate on that below.
All 32 cells in our tables 6 through 9 except one (in the post-independence Hodrick-Prescott column
for final real GDP gap data in Table 8, the only estimate as well that is not statistically significant at
the 1% and the 5% levels) report always (i) statistically significant and (ii) positive estimates for the
coeﬃcient to the contemporaneous output gap, bx,0, which, most importantly, (iii) indicate a unanimous
and considerable rise in the magnitude of the corresponding structural-form parameter, βx,0, in the
post-independence period! This is therefore a robust finding that at first puzzled us a bit: why should
a central bank in an inflation targeting regime increase its reaction to the output gap after receiving
operational independence, with its reaction to inflation at the same time most likely not much changed
or, if increased, not at a comparable degree? Well, to see why this is exactly what a central bank
whose priority is to keep inflation low should do, the more so under inflation targeting, one needs to
take into consideration the stage of the business cycle as well, in particular before and after operational
independence.
4.3.3. Asymmetric Monetary Policy Response Across the Business Cycle. The easiest way to understand
such logic is to look at the (dominant) phase of the business cycle before and after operational indepen-
dence. Comparing the descriptive statistics in panels A and B of Table 1 in Appendix A, one can find
that the mean output gap in 1992:4-1997:1 has been of the order of −0.38% (Hodrick-Prescott measure)
to −1.24% (quadratic measure) if final GDP data are used and of the order of −0.34% (Hodrick-Prescott
measure) to −0.97% (quadratic measure) with real-time GDP data instead; the same statistic for the
period of operational independence, 1997:3-2004:4 (or 2001:4 for real-time GDP data) is, respectively, of
the order of 0.07% (Hodrick-Prescott measure) to 0.16% (quadratic measure) if final GDP data are used
and of the order of 0.11% (Hodrick-Prescott measure) to −0.05% (quadratic measure) with real-time
GDP data. Similar conclusions can be inferred from figures 7 and 8 in Appendix A. This dimension
of our analysis makes a clear point: the Bank of England has reacted in a much stronger way to the
output gap when aggregate demand has, on average, been close(r) to potential, thus creating inflationary
pressures, i.e., (mostly) during the post-independence period.
4.3.4. Additional Robustness Checks. To check this empirically identified asymmetry in the magnitude
(not the sign) of the central bank’s response to the output gap depending on the business cycle, we have
proceeded to estimations of the same Taylor rule specifications but with real GDP growth replacing real
GDP gap. This is also another way of continuing our extensive sensitivity analysis here, embodied in the
various specifications and proxies involved.
Has the Bank Reacted to Real GDP Growth? So, during operational independence the Bank of England
has reacted more aggressively to the output gap relative to the pre-independence inflation targeting
period. This is true (i) no matter how the output gap is measured; (ii) no matter the alternative
proxies for all variables included in our forward-looking Taylor rules; (iii) and no matter the several lead
specifications estimated that make sense from both a statistical and an economic point of view.
But has the Bank also reacted in a similar way to real GDP growth? Table 10 presents evidence that
what the Bank of England has really cared about throughout the inflation targeting period is the output
gap and not the rate of growth of real output: nowhere in this table, before as well as after operational
independence, is the coeﬃcient on real GDP growth statistically significant at all. The UK data thus
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clearly reject the idea that real GDP growth should enter Taylor rules in place of the real GDP gap, as
some authors have suggested (often because of the measurability problems inherent in the output gap
definition).
And there is good economic logic behind such a finding. It can be summarized in the following way.
There is no need for a central bank to (aggressively) react to any change in the rate of growth of real
GDP per se; for example, real expenditure may grow in a depressed economy and there is no need to
overhastily fight such a (stabilizing) tendency. It is only with respect to a benchmark potential output
that the increase in aggregate demand should matter for inflationary expectations, and hence for an
inflation-targeting central bank. But once aggregate expenditure comes close to the estimated capacity
of an economy to produce output and threatens to surpass it, thus creating inflationary pressure and
aﬀecting unfavorably the rational expectations of economic agents about future inflation, the central bank
should respond (aggressively), the more so under an inflation targeting framework. That is our major,
and we would hope, novel interpretation of the empirical findings in the present paper. It furthermore
confirms that the Bank of England has reacted flexibly, in a justified and consistent way, to the changing
business cycle conditions in the period of its operational independence relative to the pre-independence
inflation targeting period, as also implied by its mandate.
What about an Explicit Exchange Rate Term? As a last robustness check of our findings, we also per-
formed Taylor rule regressions with an explicit exchange rate term, namely the nominal eﬀective exchange
rate (NEER) index, added to the standard variables in (2.5). As one can verify in Table 11, a general
conclusion when including the NEER into our alternative specifications is that it is, as a rule, statistically
significant but of a very negligible magnitude, practically close to zero, and with an uncertain — that
is, switching across specifications — sign. More importantly, the inclusion of the NEER also makes all
policy responses unrealistically low, the more so during the operational independence period, while at
the same time pushing the interest rate smoothing parameter and, especially, the adjusted R2 for the
regressions conspicuously high, which is indicative of a likely misspecification. For this reason we avoid
here any further comments on our forward-looking Taylor rules with an explicit exchange rate term.
5. Concluding Comments
This paper contributed to the empirical investigation of whether increased central bank independence
matters for the conduct of monetary policy, in particular within a broader and stable inflation targeting
framework. We took advantage of the unique experience in that sense of the United Kingdom: the Bank
of England was granted operational independence from HM Treasury in May 1997, whereas inflation
targeting had been eﬀective since October 1992. Our econometric strategy focused on estimating forward-
looking Taylor rules using the GMM approach, theoretically consistent with the New Keynesian monetary
policy model recently popularized in similar contexts by Clarida, Galí and Gertler. Yet we also applied
OLS and TSLS to classic and backward-looking Taylor rules, for the purpose of comparisons with earlier
work as well as across our alternative econometric techniques, regression specifications and variable
proxies.
An interesting finding from our empirical study is that classic Taylor rules perform impressively in
describing (ex post) UK monetary policy throughout the period of operational independence; moreover,
such rules indicate that the Bank of England has definitely responded to the output gap after indepen-
dence but not before. However, because of the criticisms to equations this type, we place predominant
weight and a substantial confidence of robustness on our extensive results from estimating via GMM
forward-looking feedback rules incorporating interest rate smoothing. These results generally confirm
what OLS and TSLS have partly uncovered earlier.
One principal lesson we extract from UK quarterly data is that, perhaps astonishingly at first sight,
the Bank of England has reacted much more aggressively to the output gap after receiving independence.
This asymmetry of the monetary policy reaction function remains robust across a number of Taylor rule
specifications and alternative proxies for the explanatory variables. We argue that it is fully consistent
with an inflation targeting central bank when the stage of the business cycle is also taken into consid-
eration. Our main contribution is to present evidence that the Bank of England has responded to the
output gap, the more so in periods when it is positive or close to zero and when inflation is at the same
time credibly stabilized around target, and not at all to output growth. This is exactly how it should
be according to New Keynesian theory, in particular under inflation targeting when the primary (if not
the only) concern of the central bank is to keep low and stable inflation. The monetary authority should
care (for theoretical reasons), and did seem to care (in our empirical results), not whether aggregate
expenditure on output grows per se, but whether such growth implies — as would be in a stage of the
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business cycle above or close to potential output — increasing inflationary pressure or not. As far as the
magnitude of the reaction of the Bank of England to inflation and its degree of interest rate smoothing
are concerned, we do not find overwhelming evidence to conclude in favor of any important, substantial
change across our two subsamples, pre- and post- operational independence.
Finally, to address in a summary the question we posed as a title to this study, we were not able
to arrive at a definite answer to it either. On the one hand, we here presented estimates that identify
a diﬀerent response of the Bank of England to the output gap, much stronger after it was granted
operational independence from HM Treasury. However, we also paid attention to the facts that — as the
new millennium was approaching and gradually unfolding in the UK — the stage in the business cycle
had progressively changed, passing from a recessionary to an expansionary phase, and that inflation
had been anchored at target. Given our short sample, containing roughly one full cycle of contraction
and recovery of the British economy within the inflation targeting period on which we focused, we were
not in a position to disentangle the individual contribution of each of the three principal factors we
pointed to as underlying, and largely explaining, the change in the Bank of England’s reaction function.
A provisional answer to our title could, therefore, be that the expanding economy and the anchored
inflation (and, hence, inflation expectations) have mattered at least as much, if not more, as greater
central bank autonomy in implementing the British inflation targeting strategy. There is thus much
room remaining for further research along these lines, within the UK context as well as across other
nations and monetary regimes.
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6. Appendix A: Data and Estimation Output
Panel A: Pre-Independence Subsample: 1992:4 — 1997:1
Inflation, % p.a. RGDP growth, % p.a. 3-m TBill RGDP gap, % of potential
RPI RPIX Fin data RT data rate, % p.a. HP Fin Q Fin HP RT Q RT
Mean 2.48 2.80 2.92 2.98 5.79 −0.38 −1.24 −0.34 −0.97
Median 2.54 2.81 2.84 2.77 5.76 0.04 −0.73 0.02 −0.49
Max 3.60 3.62 4.68 4.97 6.73 0.65 −0.11 0.95 0.20
Min 1.29 2.17 0.99 0.87 4.95 −2.15 −3.09 −2.35 −2.83
SD 0.65 0.35 1.03 1.13 0.58 0.97 1.04 1.06 1.10
J-B p-v 0.79 0.81 0.94 0.82 0.57 0.23 0.26 0.35 0.29
# obs 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Panel B: Post-Independence Subsample: 1997:3 — 2004:4 (or 2001:4 for real-time GDP data)
Inflation, % p.a. RGDP growth, % p.a. 3-m TBill RGDP gap, % of potential
RPI RPIX Fin data RT data rate, % p.a. HP Fin Q Fin HP RT Q RT
Mean 2.50 2.34 2.74 2.71 5.09 0.07 0.16 0.11 −0.05
Median 2.66 2.27 2.73 2.82 4.85 0.10 0.24 0.15 −0.05
Max 3.94 2.90 4.33 3.55 7.50 0.90 1.60 0.61 0.64
Min 1.04 1.85 1.52 1.63 3.50 −0.85 −1.25 −0.68 −1.35
SD 0.83 0.31 0.71 0.59 1.20 0.46 0.87 0.37 0.50
J-B p-v 0.36 0.40 0.69 0.57 0.35 0.70 0.43 0.50 0.35
# obs 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 18 18
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Data
Explanatory Note to Table 1: All data are quarterly and for the United Kingdom; RPI = Retail Price
Index; RPIX = RPI eXcluding the mortgage rate; RGDP = Real GDP; 3-m TBill rate = 3-month Treasury Bill
rate; Fin = final (data); RT = real-time (data); HP = Hodrick-Prescott (detrending); Q = quadratic (detrending);
SD = standard deviation; J-B p-v = Jarque-Bera statistic probability value (for testing the null of normality of
regression residuals); # obs = number of observations.
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Panel A: Pre-Independence Subsample: 1992:4 — 1997:1 (18 observations)
Real GDP Filter: Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott
iT 5.77∗∗∗ (0.15) 5.76∗∗∗ (0.09) 6.03∗∗∗ (0.23) 5.78∗∗∗ (0.13)
b0,0 3.88∗∗∗ (0.49) 3.68∗ (0.41) 5.00∗∗∗ (0.68) 4.58∗∗∗ (0.66)
bπ,0 0.75∗∗∗ (0.16) 0.83∗∗∗ (0.15) 0.41∗ (0.21) 0.48∗ (0.42)
bx,0 −0.03 (0.10) −0.12 (0.10) 0.27 (0.23) 0.20 (0.33)
AR1 term 0.44∗∗∗ (0.15) 0.42∗∗∗ (0.21)
Adj R2 0.63 0.66 0.75 0.72
SER 0.35 0.34 0.29 0.31
DW 0.90 1.07 AR1 correction AR1 correction
F p-v 0.000224 0.000118 0.000046 0.000101
Panel B: Post-Independence Subsample: 1997:3 — 2004:4 (30 observations)
Real GDP Filter: Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott
iT 4.95∗∗∗ (0.14) 5.01∗∗∗ (0.17) 4.56∗∗∗ (0.75) 4.18∗∗∗ (1.22)
b0,0 2.81∗∗∗ (0.45) 3.38∗∗∗ (0.56) 3.55∗∗∗ (0.81) 3.22∗∗ (1.27)
bπ,0 0.86∗∗∗ (0.17) 0.65∗∗∗ (0.21) 0.40∗∗∗ (0.14) 0.38∗∗∗ (0.14)
bx,0 0.85∗∗∗ (0.16) 0.38∗∗ (0.43) 0.37 (0.24) 0.37 (0.23)
AR1 term 0.90∗∗∗ (0.08) 0.93∗∗∗ (0.06)
Adj R2 0.61 0.39 0.92 0.91
SER 0.75 0.94 0.35 0.35
DW 0.39 0.22 AR1 correction AR1 correction
F p-v 0.000001 0.000520 0.000000 0.000000
Table 2. Classic Taylor Rules: OLS Estimates on RPI and Final Real GDP Gap
Explanatory Note to Table 2: All data are quarterly and for the United Kingdom; the method of
estimation is OLS; the estimated equations are (2.4) and (2.5), with intercepts iT and b0,0, respectively, and all
other parameters the same, as explained in the main text; standard errors for the directly estimated coeﬃcients
(iT and the b’s) are in parentheses; ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ = statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% level, respectively; AR1
= correction for an autoregressive process in the error of the regression of order 1; Adj R2 = adjusted R2; SER =
standard error of regression; DW = Durbin-Watson statistic (for testing first-order serial correlation in the error
process when there is no AR1 correction for it or lagged dependent variable in the regression specification); F
p-v = F-statistic probability value (for the joint significance of all estimated parameters).
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Panel A: RPI Chow Breakpoint Test Chow Forecast Test
Real GDP Filter: Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott
First Quarter after ERM Entry: 1990:4
F-statistic p-v 0.003453 0.251725 0.000004 0.216954
Log Likelihood R p-v 0.001965 0.000000 0.000001 0.000000
Last Quarter before Pre-Independence Subsample: 1992:3
F-statistic p-v 0.000000 0.178858 0.000000 0.111828
Log Likelihood R p-v 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
Quarter of Change from Band to Point Inflation Target: 1995:2
F-statistic p-v 0.000002 0.348599 0.000006 0.465473
Log Likelihood R p-v 0.000000 0.002369 0.000002 0.007102
Quarter of Granting Operational Independence: 1997:2
F-statistic p-v 0.000000 0.118577 0.000013 0.193673
Log Likelihood R p-v 0.000000 0.001745 0.000004 0.005389
First Quarter after Change from RPIX to CPI Target: 2004:1
F-statistic p-v 0.089051 0.166717 0.050507 0.101868
Log Likelihood R p-v 0.069090 0.130820 0.037082 0.075381
Panel B: RPIX Chow Breakpoint Test Chow Forecast Test
Real GDP Filter: Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott
First Quarter after ERM Entry: 1990:4
F-statistic p-v 0.030295 0.903319 0.007957 0.904376
Log Likelihood R p-v 0.021174 0.000041 0.004898 0.000043
Last Quarter before Pre-Independence Subsample: 1992:3
F-statistic p-v 0.021666 0.957068 0.000847 0.882228
Log Likelihood R p-v 0.014665 0.043251 0.000423 0.007572
Quarter of Change from Band to Point Inflation Target: 1995:2
F-statistic p-v 0.006954 0.704496 0.005327 0.913390
Log Likelihood R p-v 0.004226 0.045529 0.003157 0.243711
Quarter of Granting Operational Independence: 1997:2
F-statistic p-v 0.001912 0.314723 0.014014 0.674784
Log Likelihood R p-v 0.001030 0.017629 0.009100 0.152758
First Quarter after Change from RPIX to CPI Target: 2004:1
F-statistic p-v 0.962004 0.986517 0.670773 0.818735
Log Likelihood R p-v 0.957198 0.983954 0.639928 0.791767
Table 3. Chow Tests on Classic Taylor Rules with Final Real GDP Gap Data
Explanatory Note to Table 3: All data are quarterly and for the United Kingdom; Chow breakpoint
and forecast tests were performed on equation (2.5) estimated via OLS; F-statistic p-v = F-statistic probabil-
ity value (for testing the null of no structural break); Log Likelihood R p-v = Log-Likelihood Ratio statistic
probability value (for testing the null of no structural break).
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Panel A: Pre-Independence Subsample: 1992:4 — 1997:1 (18 observations)
Real GDP Filter: Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott
b0,−1 3.46∗∗∗ (0.54) 2.72∗∗∗ (0.55)
bπ,−1 −0.02 (0.20) −0.14 (0.21)
bx,−1 0.31∗∗∗ (0.09) 0.35∗∗∗ (0.09)
bi,−1 0.48∗∗∗ (0.15) 0.61∗∗∗ (0.16)
Adj R2 0.75 0.77
SER 0.29 0.28
DW lagged dep var lagged dep var
F p-v 0.000048 0.000026
Panel B: Post-Independence Subsample: 1997:3 — 2004:4 (30 observations)
Real GDP Filter: Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott
b0,−1 0.05 (0.35) 0.25 (0.37)
bπ,−1 −0.22∗ (0.12) −0.11 (0.11)
bx,−1 −0.26∗∗ (0.12) −0.18 (0.19)
bi,−1 1.10∗∗∗ (0.09) 0.99∗∗∗ (0.08)
Adj R2 0.90 0.88
SER 0.38 0.41
DW lagged dep var lagged dep var
F p-v 0.000000 0.000000
Table 4. Backward-Looking Taylor Rules: OLS Estimates on RPI and Final Real GDP Gap
Explanatory Note to Table 4: All data are quarterly and for the United Kingdom; the method of
estimation is OLS; the estimated equation is (2.9), with N = 1; standard errors for the directly estimated
(short-run) coeﬃcients (the b’s) are in parentheses; ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ = statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% level,
respectively; standard errors for the indirectly estimated (long-run) coeﬃcients (the β’s) are computed via the
delta method (see Appendix B) but not reported here, due to likely misspecification, as discussed in the main
text; Adj R2 = adjusted R2; SER = standard error of regression; DW = Durbin-Watson statistic (for testing
first-order serial correlation in the error process when there is no AR1 correction for it or lagged dependent
variable in the regression specification); lagged dep var = lagged dependent variable included in the regression;
F p-v = F-statistic probability value (for the joint significance of all estimated parameters).
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Panel A: Pre-Independence Subsample: 1992:4 — 1997:1 (18 observations)
Real GDP Filter: Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott
iT 5.74∗∗∗ (0.16) 5.75∗∗∗ (0.09) 6.20∗∗∗ (0.38) 5.78∗∗∗ (0.13)
b0,0 3.76∗∗∗ (0.53) 3.51∗∗∗ (0.44) 5.62∗∗∗ (1.13) 4.42∗∗ (1.58)
bπ,0 0.79∗∗∗ (0.17) 0.89∗∗∗ (0.16) 0.23 (0.32) 0.54 (0.61)
bx,0 −0.05 (0.11) −0.16 (0.11) 0.48 (0.45) 0.13 (0.75)
AR1 term 0.52∗∗ (0.19) 0.39 (0.48)
Adj R2 0.63 0.66 0.73 0.72
SER 0.35 0.34 0.30 0.31
DW 0.94 1.16 AR1 correction AR1 correction
F p-v 0.000228 0.000106 0.000067 0.000108
Panel B: Post-Independence Subsample: 1997:1 — 2004:4 (30 observations)
Real GDP Filter: Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott
iT 4.94∗∗∗ (0.14) 5.00∗∗∗ (0.18) 4.66∗∗∗ (0.62) 4.23∗∗∗ (1.15)
b0,0 2.77∗∗∗ (0.45) 3.43∗∗∗ (0.57) 3.63∗∗∗ (0.70) 3.40∗∗∗ (1.22)
bπ,0 0.87∗∗∗ (0.17) 0.63∗∗∗ (0.22) 0.41∗∗∗ (0.15) 0.33∗∗ (0.15)
bx,0 0.89∗∗∗ (0.17) 1.24∗∗∗ (0.42) 0.56 (0.33) 0.65∗ (0.32)
AR1 term 0.88∗∗∗ (0.10) 0.92∗∗∗ (0.07)
Adj R2 0.61 0.38 0.91 0.91
SER 0.75 0.96 0.36 0.36
DW 0.40 0.24 AR1 correction AR1 correction
F p-v 0.000001 0.000402 0.000000 0.000000
Table 5. Classic Taylor Rules: TSLS Estimates on RPI and Final Real GDP Gap
Explanatory Note to Table 5: All data are quarterly and for the United Kingdom; the method of
estimation is TSLS; the estimated equations are (2.4) and (2.5), with intercepts iT and b0,0, respectively, and
all other parameters the same, as explained in the main text; standard errors for the estimated coeﬃcients are
in parentheses; ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ = statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% level, respectively; AR1 = correction for
an autoregressive process in the error of the regression of order 1; Adj R2 = adjusted R2; SER = standard error
of regression; DW = Durbin-Watson statistic (for testing first-order serial correlation in the error process when
there is no AR1 correction for it or lagged dependent variable in the regression specification); F p-v = F-statistic
probability value (for the joint significance of all estimated parameters).
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Panel A: Pre-Independence Subsample: 1992:4 — 1997:1 (18 observations)
Real GDP Data: Final /Revised/ Real-Time /Initial/
Real GDP Filter: Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott
b0,+2 1.53∗∗∗ (0.13) 2.02∗∗∗ (0.21) 1.13∗∗∗ (0.16) 1.29∗∗∗ (0.18)
β0,+2 3.52 (0.31) 4.48 (0.47) 2.73 (0.40) 3.13 (0.43)
bπ,+2 0.38∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.21∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.45∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.37∗∗∗ (0.05)
βπ,+2 0.88 (0.08) 0.47 (0.09) 1.09 (0.09) 0.91 (0.11)
bx,0 0.11∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.21∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.07∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.12∗∗∗ (0.02)
βx,0 0.60 (0.08) 0.48 (0.07) 0.47 (0.05) 0.29 (0.06)
bi,−1 0.56∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.55∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.59∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.59∗∗∗ (0.01)
Adj R2 0.75 0.76 0.83 0.71
SER 0.29 0.28 0.31 0.31
J-stat 0.302956 0.288247 0.282935 0.289121
OvId p-v 0.79 0.82 0.82 0.82
Panel B: Post-Independence Subsample:
1997:3 — 2004:4 (28 observations) 1997:3 — 2001:4 (18 observations)
Real GDP Data: Final /Revised/ Real-Time /Initial/
Real GDP Filter: Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott
b0,+2 0.11 (0.11) −0.07 (0.15) 2.82∗∗∗ (0.22) 2.14∗∗∗ (0.20)
β0,+2 0.43 (0.44) −0.38 (0.76) 4.62 (0.37) 3.72 (0.34)
bπ,+2 0.46∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.38∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.30∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.42∗∗∗ (0.04)
βπ,+2 1.79 (0.08) 1.96 (0.14) 0.48 (0.05) 0.73 (0.06)
bx,0 0.21∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.17∗∗∗ (0.05) 0.92∗∗∗ (0.10) 1.06∗∗∗ (0.13)
βx,0 0.71 (0.16) 0.88 (0.25) 1.38 (0.16) 1.85 (0.23)
bi,−1 0.74∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.81∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.39∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.42∗∗∗ (0.03)
Adj R2 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.92
SER 0.35 0.35 0.24 0.29
J-stat 0.217969 0.224985 0.159138 0.264661
OvId p-v 0.73 0.71 0.97 0.85
Table 6. Forward-Looking Taylor Rules: GMM Estimates on RPI
Explanatory Note to Table 6: All data are quarterly and for the United Kingdom; inflation is com-
puted using the RPI; the method of estimation is GMM; the instrument set includes 4 lags of all (3) variables in
the estimated equation, (4.9), with k = 2 and q = 0; standard errors for the directly estimated (reduced-form)
coeﬃcients (the b’s) in parentheses are calculated using a Newey-West weighting matrix robust to error auto-
correlation and heteroskedasticity of unknown form; ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ = statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% level,
respectively; standard errors for the indirectly estimated (structural-form) coeﬃcients (the β’s) are computed
via the delta method (see Appendix B); Adj R2 = adjusted R2; SER = standard error of regression; J stat =
J-statistic: equals the minimized value of the objective function in GMM estimation and is used, following Hansen
(1982), to test the validity of overidentifying restrictions when there are more instruments than parameters to
estimate, like in our case here (we have 3 × 4 + 1 = 13 instruments, including the constant, to estimate 4
parameters, and so there are 13 − 4 = 9 overidentifying restrictions: under the null that the overidentifying
restrictions are satisfied, the J-statistic times the number of regression observations is distributed asymptotically
χ2 (m) with degrees of freedom m equal to the number of overidentifying restrictions, 9 in our case); OvId p-v
= probability value of the above-summarized Hansen test for m = 9 overidentifying restrictions.
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Panel A: Pre-Independence Subsample: 1992:4 - 1997:1 (18 observations)
Real GDP Filter: Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott
b0,+2 or b0,+3 1.43∗∗∗ (0.13) 2.13∗∗∗ (0.24) 2.01∗∗∗ (0.17) 1.38∗∗∗ (0.19)
β0,+2 or β0,+3 2.04 (0.19) 3.10 (0.36) 4.58 (0.38) 3.49 (0.47)
bπ,+3 1.01∗∗∗ (0.08) 0.69∗∗∗ (0.17)
βπ,+3 1.45 (0.12) 1.01 (0.24)
bπ,+2 0.29∗∗∗ (0.08) 0.32∗∗∗ (0.05)
βπ,+2 0.67 (0.19) 0.81 (0.14)
bx,0 0.20∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.18∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.39∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.37∗∗∗ (0.02)
βx,0 0.59 (0.02) 0.27 (0.02) 0.63 (0.05) 0.97 (0.04)
bi,−1 0.30∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.31∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.56∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.60∗∗∗ (0.02)
Adj R2 0.63 0.66 0.66 0.68
SER 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.34
J-stat 0.287835 0.286511 0.291358 0.287604
OvId p-v 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.82
Panel B: Post-Independence Subsample: 1997:3 — 2001:4 (18 observations)
Real GDP Filter: Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott
b0,+2 or b0,+3 2.56∗∗∗ (0.13) 0.63∗ (0.31) 3.01∗∗∗ (0.17) 3.76∗∗∗ (0.22)
β0,+2 or β0,+3 3.45 (0.17) 1.37 (0.68) 4.75 (0.27) 4.52 (0.26)
bπ,+3 0.79∗∗∗ (0.07) 0.83∗∗∗ (0.14)
βπ,+3 1.07 (0.09) 1.83 (0.31)
bπ,+2 0.31∗∗∗ (0.10) 0.41 (0.26)
βπ,+2 0.50 (0.16) 0.50 (0.29)
bx,0 1.41∗∗∗ (0.06) 1.09∗∗∗ (0.08) 1.39∗∗∗ (0.03) 2.07∗∗∗ (0.08)
βx,0 1.70 (0.08) 2.39 (0.18) 1.79 (0.06) 2.50 (0.10)
bi,−1 0.26∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.54∗∗∗ (0.06) 0.37∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.17∗∗∗ (0.08)
Adj R2 0.90 0.85 0.86 0.75
SER 0.32 0.40 0.38 0.51
J-stat 0.313208 0.286564 0.303636 0.322399
OvId p-v 0.78 0.82 0.79 0.74
Table 7. Forward-Looking Taylor Rules: GMM Estimates on RPIX and Real-Time
Real GDP Gap
Explanatory Note to Table 7: All data are quarterly and for the United Kingdom; inflation is com-
puted using the RPIX and the output gap using real-time real GDP data; the method of estimation is GMM;
the instrument set includes 4 lags of all (3) variables in the estimated equation, (4.9), with k = 2, 3, alterna-
tively, and q = 0; standard errors for the directly estimated (reduced-form) coeﬃcients (the b’s) in parentheses
are calculated using a Newey-West weighting matrix robust to error autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity of
unknown form; ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ = statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% level, respectively; standard errors for the
indirectly estimated (structural-form) coeﬃcients (the β’s) are computed via the delta method (see Appendix
B); Adj R2 = adjusted R2; SER = standard error of regression; J stat = J-statistic: equals the minimized value
of the objective function in GMM estimation and is used, following Hansen (1982), to test the validity of overi-
dentifying restrictions when there are more instruments than parameters to estimate, like in our case here (we
have 3× 4+ 1 = 13 instruments, including the constant, to estimate 4 parameters, and so there are 13− 4 = 9
overidentifying restrictions: under the null that the overidentifying restrictions are satisfied, the J-statistic times
the number of regression observations is distributed asymptotically χ2 (m) with degrees of freedom m equal to
the number of overidentifying restrictions, 9 in our case); OvId p-v = probability value of the above-summarized
Hansen test for m = 9 overidentifying restrictions.
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Panel A: Pre-Independence Subsample: 1992:4 — 1997:1 (18 observations)
Real GDP Data: Final /Revised/ Real-Time /Initial/
Real GDP Filter: Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott
b0,+2 2.02∗∗∗ (0.44) 1.22∗∗∗ (0.12) 1.29∗∗∗ (0.28) 1.09∗∗∗ (0.23)
β0,+2 6.73 (1.46) 3.46 (0.34) 4.18 (0.90) 3.77 (0.81)
bπ,+2 0.08 (0.09) 0.29∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.25∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.20∗∗∗ (0.04)
βπ,+2 0.27 (0.30) 0.83 (0.07) 0.80 (0.14) 0.71 (0.13)
bx,0 0.47∗∗∗ (0.05) 0.20∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.28∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.30∗∗∗ (0.03)
βx,0 0.60 (0.18) 0.57 (0.07) 0.48 (0.08) 1.05 (0.10)
bi,−1 0.70∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.65∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.69∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.71∗∗∗ (0.03)
Adj R2 0.64 0.78 0.73 0.72
SER 0.35 0.27 0.30 0.31
J-stat 0.241222 0.284699 0.278124 0.292866
OvId p-v 0.89 0.82 0.83 0.81
Panel B: Post-Independence Subsample:
1997:3 — 2004:4 (28 observations) 1997:3 — 2001:4 (18 observations)
Real GDP Data: Final /Revised/ Real-Time /Initial/
Real GDP Filter: Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott
b0,+2 0.17 (0.16) −0.13 (0.14) 2.49∗∗∗ (0.31) 1.70∗∗∗ (0.21)
β0,+2 0.61 (0.56) −1.96 (2.18) 4.33 (0.54) 3.31 (0.41)
bπ,+2 0.48∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.23∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.35∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.47∗∗∗ (0.03)
βπ,+2 1.70 (0.11) 3.52 (0.42) 0.61 (0.06) 0.91 (0.05)
bx,0 0.28∗∗∗ (0.05) −0.13∗ (0.07) 0.83∗∗∗ (0.15) 0.83∗∗∗ (0.11)
βx,0 0.74 (0.16) −2.01 (1.15) 1.51 (0.25) 1.60 (0.21)
bi,−1 0.72∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.93∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.42∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.49∗∗∗ (0.03)
Adj R2 0.93 0.91 0.96 0.95
SER 0.33 0.37 0.20 0.24
J-stat 0.248857 0.200585 0.193018 0.285365
OvId p-v 0.64 0.78 0.94 0.82
Table 8. Forward-Looking Taylor Rules: GMM Estimates on RPISA
Explanatory Note to Table 8: All data are quarterly and for the United Kingdom; inflation is com-
puted using the RPI but seasonally adjusted ; the method of estimation is GMM; the instrument set includes 4
lags of all (3) variables in the estimated equation, (4.9), with k = 2 and q = 0; standard errors for the directly
estimated (reduced-form) coeﬃcients (the b’s) in parentheses are calculated using a Newey-West weighting matrix
robust to error autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity of unknown form; ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ = statistical significance at
the 1, 5, 10% level, respectively; standard errors for the indirectly estimated (structural-form) coeﬃcients (the
β’s) are computed via the delta method (see Appendix B); Adj R2 = adjusted R2; SER = standard error of
regression; J stat = J-statistic: equals the minimized value of the objective function in GMM estimation and is
used, following Hansen (1982), to test the validity of overidentifying restrictions when there are more instruments
than parameters to estimate, like in our case here (we have 3× 4 + 1 = 13 instruments, including the constant,
to estimate 4 parameters, and so there are 13 − 4 = 9 overidentifying restrictions: under the null that the
overidentifying restrictions are satisfied, the J-statistic times the number of regression observations is distributed
asymptotically χ2 (m) with degrees of freedom m equal to the number of overidentifying restrictions, 9 in our
case); OvId p-v = probability value of the above-summarized Hansen test for m = 9 overidentifying restrictions.
32 ALEXANDER MIHAILOV
Panel A: Pre-Independence Subsample: 1992:4 - 1997:1 (18 observations)
Real GDP Filter: Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott
b0,+2 or b0,+3 2.38∗∗∗ (0.26) 1.69∗∗∗ (0.14) 2.38∗∗∗ (0.10) 1.11∗∗∗ (0.27)
β0,+2 or β0,+3 5.84 (0.64) 2.52 (0.21) 5.74 (0.25) 3.33 (0.80)
bπ,+3 0.02 (0.18) 0.84∗∗∗ (0.11)
βπ,+3 0.06 (0.42) 1.25 (0.16)
bπ,+2 0.04 (0.07) 0.30∗∗∗ (0.07)
βπ,+2 0.10 (0.17) 0.89 (0.23)
bx,0 0.29∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.20∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.29∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.40∗∗∗ (0.02)
βx,0 0.58 (0.06) 0.27 (0.02) 0.74 (0.05) 1.21 (0.07)
bi,−1 0.59∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.33∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.59∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.67∗∗∗ (0.03)
Adj R2 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.67
SER 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.34
J-stat 0.276950 0.301620 0.277380 0.268906
OvId p-v 0.84 0.80 0.83 0.85
Panel B: Post-Independence Subsample: 1997:3 — 2001:4 (18 observations)
Real GDP Filter: Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott
b0,+2 or b0,+3 2.41∗∗∗ (0.12) 2.42∗∗∗ (0.53) 2.35∗∗∗ (0.16) 0.12 (0.41)
β0,+2 or β0,+3 4.67 (0.23) 7.27 (1.60) 4.58 (0.31) 0.41 (1.42)
bπ,+3 0.29∗∗∗ (0.06) −0.17 (0.25)
βπ,+3 0.57 (0.11) −0.50 (0.75)
bπ,+2 0.30∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.67∗∗∗ (0.17)
βπ,+2 0.59 (0.08) 2.32 (0.60)
bx,0 1.29∗∗∗ (0.06) 1.28∗∗∗ (0.22) 1.28∗∗∗ (0.08) 0.92∗∗∗ (0.24)
βx,0 1.87 (0.12) 3.84 (0.66) 1.83 (0.16) 3.17 (0.82)
bi,−1 0.48∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.67∗∗∗ (0.08) 0.49∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.71∗∗∗ (0.13)
Adj R2 0.86 0.64 0.85 0.76
SER 0.38 0.61 0.40 0.50
J-stat 0.309280 0.266308 0.314787 0.294176
OvId p-v 0.78 0.85 0.77 0.81
Table 9. Forward-Looking Taylor Rules: GMM Estimates on RPIXSA and Real-Time
Real GDP Gap
Explanatory Note to Table 9: All data are quarterly and for the United Kingdom; inflation is com-
puted using the RPIX but seasonally adjusted and the output gap using real-time real GDP data; the method
of estimation is GMM; the instrument set includes 4 lags of all (3) variables in the estimated equation, (4.9),
with k = 2, 3, alternatively, and q = 0; standard errors for the directly estimated (reduced-form) coeﬃcients
(the b’s) in parentheses are calculated using a Newey-West weighting matrix robust to error autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity of unknown form; ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ = statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% level, respectively;
standard errors for the indirectly estimated (structural-form) coeﬃcients (the β’s) are computed via the delta
method (see Appendix B); Adj R2 = adjusted R2; SER = standard error of regression; J stat = J-statistic: equals
the minimized value of the objective function in GMM estimation and is used, following Hansen (1982), to test
the validity of overidentifying restrictions when there are more instruments than parameters to estimate, like in
our case here (we have 3 × 4 + 1 = 13 instruments, including the constant, to estimate 4 parameters, and so
there are 13−4 = 9 overidentifying restrictions: under the null that the overidentifying restrictions are satisfied,
the J-statistic times the number of regression observations is distributed asymptotically χ2 (m) with degrees of
freedom m equal to the number of overidentifying restrictions, 9 in our case); OvId p-v = probability value of
the above-summarized Hansen test for m = 9 overidentifying restrictions.
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Panel A: Pre-Independence Subsample: 1992:4 — 1997:1 (18 observations)
Real GDP Data: Final /Revised/ Real-Time /Initial/
b0,+2 0.81∗∗∗ (0.14) 1.13∗∗∗ (0.29)
β0,+2 1.95 (0.33) 2.53 (0.65)
bπ,+2 0.57∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.49∗∗∗ (0.05)
βπ,+2 1.36 (0.09) 1.11 (0.12)
by,0 −0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
βy,0 −0.02 (0.04) 0.02 (0.04)
bi,−1 0.58∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.56∗∗∗ (0.03)
Adj R2 0.68 0.67
SER 0.33 0.33
J-stat 0.283959 0.290898
OvId p-v 0.82 0.81
Panel B: Post-Independence Subsample: 1997:1 — 2004:4 (28 observations)
Real GDP Data: Final /Revised/ Real-Time /Initial/
b0,+2 −0.08 (0.08) 1.61∗∗∗ (0.25)
β0,+2 −0.64 (0.61) 2.88 (0.45)
bπ,+2 0.30∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.56∗∗∗ (0.04)
βπ,+2 2.27 (0.29) 1.00 (0.08)
by,0 0.01 (0.04) 0.12 (0.07)
βy,0 0.08 (0.37) 0.21 (0.13)
bi,−1 0.87∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.44∗∗∗ (0.05)
Adj R2 0.93 0.88
SER 0.33 0.36
J-stat 0.199089 0.262429
OvId p-v 0.78 0.86
Table 10. Forward-Looking Taylor Rules: GMM Estimates on RPI and Real GDP Growth
Explanatory Note to Table 10: All data are quarterly and for the United Kingdom; inflation is
computed using the RPI and real GDP growth (not gap); the method of estimation is GMM; the instrument
set includes 4 lags of all (3) variables in the estimated equation, (4.9), with k = 2 and q = 0; standard errors
for the directly estimated (reduced-form) coeﬃcients (the b’s) in parentheses are calculated using a Newey-West
weighting matrix robust to error autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity of unknown form; ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ = statistical
significance at the 1, 5, 10% level, respectively; standard errors for the indirectly estimated (structural-form)
coeﬃcients (the β’s) are computed via the delta method (see Appendix B); Adj R2 = adjusted R2; SER =
standard error of regression; J stat = J-statistic: equals the minimized value of the objective function in GMM
estimation and is used, following Hansen (1982), to test the validity of overidentifying restrictions when there are
more instruments than parameters to estimate, like in our case here (we have 3×4+1 = 13 instruments, including
the constant, to estimate 4 parameters, and so there are 13− 4 = 9 overidentifying restrictions: under the null
that the overidentifying restrictions are satisfied, the J-statistic times the number of regression observations is
distributed asymptotically χ2 (m) with degrees of freedom m equal to the number of overidentifying restrictions,
9 in our case); OvId p-v = probability value of the above-summarized Hansen test for m = 9 overidentifying
restrictions.
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Panel A: Pre-Independence Subsample: 1992:4 — 1997:1 (18 observations)
Real GDP Filter: Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott
b0,+2 3.04∗∗∗ (0.02) 1.40∗∗∗ (0.02)
bπ,+2 0.11∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.41∗∗∗ (0.02)
bx,0 0.39∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.25∗∗∗ (0.01)
be,0 −0.02∗∗∗ (0.00) −0.02∗∗∗ (0.00)
bi,−1 0.49∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.57∗∗∗ (0.00)
Adj R2 0.80 0.75
SER 0.27 0.29
J-stat 0.324132 0.306326
OvId p-v 0.76 0.79
Panel B: Post-Independence Subsample: 1997:1 — 2004:4 (28 observations)
Real GDP Filter: Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott
b0,+2 1.10∗∗∗ (0.01) 1.16.∗∗∗ (0.09)
bπ,+2 0.02 (0.03) 0.01 (0.02)
bx,0 0.06∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.09∗∗∗ (0.02)
be,0 0.05∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.05∗∗∗ (0.00)
bi,−1 0.76∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.75∗∗∗ (0.01)
Adj R2 0.93 0.93
SER 0.33 0.32
J-stat 0.321897 0.211948
OvId p-v 0.74 0.75
Table 11. Forward-Looking Taylor Rules: GMM Estimates on RPI, Real GDP Gap
and NEER
Explanatory Note to Table 11: All data are quarterly and for the United Kingdom; inflation is
computed using the RPI; the method of estimation is GMM; the instrument set includes 4 lags of all (4) variables
in the estimated equation, (4.9), with an explicit nominal eﬀective exchange rate (NEER) index term, k = 2 and
q = 0; standard errors for the directly estimated (reduced-form) coeﬃcients (the b’s) in parentheses are calculated
using a Newey-West weighting matrix robust to error autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity of unknown form;
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ = statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% level, respectively; standard errors for the indirectly estimated
(structural-form) coeﬃcients (the β’s) were not computed because of the likely misspecification, as discussed in
the main text; Adj R2 = adjusted R2; SER = standard error of regression; J stat = J-statistic: equals the
minimized value of the objective function in GMM estimation and is used, following Hansen (1982), to test the
validity of overidentifying restrictions when there are more instruments than parameters to estimate, like in our
case here (we have 3× 4 + 1 = 13 instruments, including the constant, to estimate 4 parameters, and so there
are 13 − 4 = 9 overidentifying restrictions: under the null that the overidentifying restrictions are satisfied,
the J-statistic times the number of regression observations is distributed asymptotically χ2 (m) with degrees of
freedom m equal to the number of overidentifying restrictions, 9 in our case); OvId p-v = probability value of
the above-summarized Hansen test for m = 9 overidentifying restrictions.
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Figure 1. UK: Evolution of Bank of England’s Operating Instrument and Reference
Interest Rate, in % p.a.
Graph Source: Bank of England (BoE), website.
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Figure 2. UK under Inflation Targeting: 3-Month Treasury Bill Rate, in % p.a., Before
and After Bank of England’s Operational Independence (the shadowed zone corresponds
to the pre-independence subsample, the dashed lines indicate the average interest rate
for each subsample)
Data Source: Oﬃce of National Statistics (ONS), website.
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Figure 3. UK Price Level Evolution: RPI vs RPIX
Data Source: Oﬃce of National Statistics (ONS), website.
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Figure 4. UK Output Evolution: Final Real GDP vs Real-Time Real GDP
Data Source: Oﬃce of National Statistics (ONS), website.
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Figure 5. UK under Inflation Targeting: RPI Inflation vs RPIX Inflation Before and
After Bank of England’s Operational Independence (the shadowed zone corresponds to
the pre-independence subsample)
Data Source: Oﬃce of National Statistics (ONS), website.
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Figure 6. UK under Inflation Targeting: Real GDP Growth Before and After Bank
of England’s Operational Independence, Final vs Real-Time Data (the shadowed zone
corresponds to the pre-independence subsample)
Data Source: Oﬃce of National Statistics (ONS), website.
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Figure 7. UK under Inflation Targeting: Final Real GDP Gap, in % Deviation from
Potential, Before and After Bank of England’s Operational Independence, Hodrick-
Prescott vs Quadratic Filtered Measure (the shadowed zone corresponds to the pre-
independence subsample)
Data Source: Oﬃce of National Statistics (ONS), website.
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Figure 8. UK under Inflation Targeting: Real-Time Real GDP Gap, in % Deviation
from Potential, Before and After Bank of England’s Operational Independence, Hodrick-
Prescott vs Quadratic Filtered Measures (the shadowed zone corresponds to the pre-
independence subsample, Nelson-Nikolov (2001) real-time real GDP data for the UK
end in 2001:4)
Data Source: Oﬃce of National Statistics (ONS), website.
HAS MORE INDEPENDENCE AFFECTED BANK OF ENGLAND’S REACTION FUNCTION? 39
7. Appendix B: Analytical Derivation of Delta Method Standard Errors
We here explain how we computed standard errors for the parameters of interest in the estimated
forward- and backward -looking Taylor rules for the UK during the inflation targeting period by applying
the delta method.
7.1. The Delta Method: Essence and Literature. The delta method is a technique for approxi-
mating the moments of functions of random variables. Oehlert (1992, p. 27) attributes its first fairly
rigorous statement, in a less general form, to Cramér (1946, p. 353). It is also used to compute the
moments of an approximating asymptotic distribution, for example in Rao (1965, p. 319) or Bishop,
Feinberg and Holland (1975, p. 48). Hurt (1976), Loève (1977, p. 166 and p. 276) and Lehmann (1983,
p. 106, Theorem 5.1, and p. 109, Theorem 5.1b) have extended Cramér’s results theoretically, while
other authors (see the note by Oehlert (1992)) have provided applications and examples.
In what follows we report in detail how we computed the standard errors for all indirectly estimated
policy response parameters in our forward-looking Taylor rule specifications. We then briefly show the
analogy with computing the same statistics for the backward -looking Taylor rules in our context, which
is exploited here for the case of four structural parameters to recover.
7.2. The Delta Method: Application to Forward-Looking Taylor Rules. As described in section
4 of the main text, in the present paper we focused on estimating forward-looking versions of the Taylor
rule in the tradition of Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1997, 1998 a, b, 2000) and the subsequent literature. In
particular, we used the GMM approach to estimate equation (4.9). By defining β0,+k ≡ β1, βπ,+k ≡ β2,
βx,+q ≡ β3 and βi,−1 ≡ βi (L) ≡ β4, (4.9) can also be written as
(7.1) it = (1− β4)β1 + (1− β4)β2πt+k + (1− β4)β3xt+q + β4it−1 + εt,
with εt given by (4.10) in the main text.
But what we estimated was, and the coeﬃcients we obtained in result were, in fact
(7.2) it = b1 + b2πt+k + b3xt+q + b4it−1 + et.
Following Surico (2004), among others, let us call the directly estimated coeﬃcients in (7.2) reduced-
form parameters and stack them in a vector (as is common in econometrics, we denote below these
estimates by a hat), bb ≡ ³ bb1 bb2 bb3 bb4 ´0.
However, we are interested to recover estimates, with standard errors, and interpret what we may call
(respective) structural(-form) parameters, bβ ≡ ³ bβ1 bβ2 bβ3 bβ4 ´0.
It is easy to see how both sets of true (or population) parameters (denoted below by a zero superscript,
as in classical econometrics), in (7.2) and in (7.1), are related:
b01 ≡
¡
1− β04
¢
β01,
b02 ≡
¡
1− β04
¢
β02,
b03 ≡
¡
1− β04
¢
β03,
b04 ≡ β04.
Hence (inversely),
β01 ≡
b01
1− β04
≡ b
0
1
1− b04
,
β02 ≡
b02
1− β04
≡ b
0
2
1− b04
,
β03 ≡
b03
1− β04
≡ b
0
3
1− b04
,
β04 ≡ b04.
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We have thus expressed all true (or population) structural -form parameters, in which we are theoret-
ically interested, as respective functions of the true (or population) reduced-form parameters, for which
we have obtained (direct) empirical estimates from our sample. In a more compact notation, this can
be written as a vector-valued function
β0 = f
¡
b0
¢
,
or, more precisely,
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
β01
β02
β03
β04
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
f
¡
b01, b04
¢
f
¡
b02, b04
¢
f
¡
b03, b04
¢
b04
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
b01
1−b04
b02
1−b04
b03
1−b04
b04
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
Having then estimated the sample reduced-form parameters bb, we can approximate the sample struc-
tural-form parameters bβ by
bβ = f ³bb´ ,
or,
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
bβ1bβ2bβ3bβ4
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
f
³bb1,bb4´
f
³bb2,bb4´
f
³bb3,bb4´bb4
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
bb1
1−bb4bb2
1−bb4bb3
1−bb4bb4
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
To compute the (approximate) standard errors for the (indirect) sample estimates of the structural
parameters bβ, we need to recur to the now standard technique in similar circumstances known as the
delta method.
7.2.1. Taylor Approximation to Nonlinear Function of Random Variables (Sample Estimators). The first
step in it is to apply Taylor expansion to approximate the nonlinear relationship among the respective
estimated parameters around their true values. Note that the Taylor approximation in this case is an
approximation to a function of a random variable, the random variable being the estimator for each
regressor i.
Scalar-Valued Function. Let us begin, for clarity, by considering the scalar case:
β0i ≡
b0i
1− b04
, i = 1, 2, 3.
An assumption is made that the (sample) estimators bβi for each respective regressor i are (asymptoti-
cally) normally distributed around their respective true (or population) values β0i with variance
³
ω0βi
´2
:
(7.3) bβi ∼ N µβ0i ,³ω0βi´2¶⇔ ³bβi − β0i´ ∼ N µ0,³ω0βi´2¶
The first-order (or linear) Taylor approximation around the true value β0i of the estimated parameter
of interest bβi is then given by:24
f
³bβi´ ≈ f ¡β0i ¢+ f 0 ¡β0i ¢ ³bβi − β0i´ ,
or
(7.4) f
³bβi´− f ¡β0i ¢ ≈ f 0 ¡β0i ¢ ³bβi − β0i´ .
Taking expectations of both sides of (7.4):
24See, for instance, Green (2000), p. 50.
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E
h
f
³bβi´− f ¡β0i ¢i ≈ f 0 ¡β0i ¢| {z }
=const
E
³bβi − β0i´| {z }
= E
hbβii− β0i| {z }
=0
= 0.
So, rewriting for the mean of the function of the estimator f
³bβi´:
(7.5) E
h
f
³bβi´i = f ¡β0i ¢ ,
and the estimated (or feasible) equivalent to (7.5) will thus be:
(7.6) bE hf ³bβi´i = f ³bβi´ .
Now, squaring both sides of (7.4):h
f
³bβi´− f ¡β0i ¢i2 ≈ hf 0 ¡β0i ¢ ³bβi − β0i´i2 ,
the RHS of which can also be written ash
f
³bβi´− f ¡β0i ¢i2 ≈ £f 0 ¡β0i ¢¤2 ³bβi − β0i´2 ,
and, again, taking expectations from the squared expression just above:
E
h
f
³bβi´− f ¡β0i ¢i2| {z }
≡V ar[f(bβi)]
≈
£
f 0
¡
β0i
¢¤2| {z }
=const
E
∙³bβi − β0i´2¸| {z } .
≡V ar[bβi]≡³ω0βi´2 from (7.3)
So, re-writing for the variance of the function of the estimator f
³bβi´:
(7.7) V ar
h
f
³bβi´i = £f 0 ¡β0i ¢¤2 ³ω0βi´2 ,
and the estimated (or feasible) equivalent to (7.7) will thus be
(7.8) dV ar hf ³bβi´i = hf 0 ³bβi´i2 ¡bωβi¢2 .
For the distribution of f
³bβi´, a function of the parameter estimator for each regressor i (in the given
sample of size T ), we have thus verified that
f
³bβi´ as∼ N µf ¡β0i ¢ , £f 0 ¡β0i ¢¤2 ³ω0βi´2¶ .
We have also established, in eﬀect, that the distribution of f
³bβi´−f ¡β0i ¢, a function of the parameter
estimator for each regressor i (in the given sample of size T ) expressed in deviation from the same function
of its true (or population) mean, converges almost surely to the normal distribution with zero mean and
variance equal to
£
f 0
¡
β0i
¢¤2 ³
ω0βi
´2
:
(7.9) f
³bβi´− f ¡β0i ¢ as∼ N µ0, £f 0 ¡β0i ¢¤2 ³ω0βi´2¶ .
Analogously, one can show that
f
³bbi´− f ¡b0i ¢ as∼ N ³0, £f 0 ¡b0i ¢¤2 ¡σ0bi¢2´ ,
where
¡
σ0bi
¢2 ≡ V ar hbbii ≡ E ∙³bbi − b0i´2¸.
Now, in our case here the specific functional relation between the structural parameters (to be recov-
ered) and the reduced-form ones (that were estimated) is given by β4 ≡ b4 and
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βi ≡ f (bi, b4) ≡
µ
bi
1− b4
¶
, i = 1, 2, 3.
Hence, the first derivative w.r.t. b1 will be
f 0 (β1) ≡
∂f
³
b1
1−b4
´
∂b1
=
=1z}|{
(b1)
0 (1− b4) + b1
=0z }| {
(1− b4)0
(1− b4)2
=
(1− b4)
(1− b4)2
=
1
1− b4
.
The same expressions for the first and second derivatives w.r.t. b2 and b3 can be analogously obtained.
W.r.t. b4 the first derivative will be
f 0 (β4) ≡
∂f
³
b4
1−b4
´
∂b4
=
=1z}|{
(b4)
0 (1− b4) + b4
=−1z }| {
(1− b4)0
(1− b4)2
=
(1− b4)− b4
(1− b4)2
=
1− 2b4
(1− b4)2
.
Vector-Valued Function. Until now we looked at the scalar case, that is, at the case of approximating
a function of a single random variable (such as any of our sample estimators i taken individually),
or of approximating a scalar-valued function. Generalization to the vector case — that is, the case of
approximating a function of more than one random variables (such as our sample estimators i taken
altogether in a vector), or of approximating a vector-valued function — builds upon the analogy. We now
write, introducing the following matrix notation for the coeﬃcients of the structural form:
bβ
(4×1)
∼ N
Ã
β0
(4×1)
, Ω0
(4×4)
!
⇔
Ã bβ
(4×1)
− β0
(4×1)
!
∼ N
µ
0
(4×1)
, Ω0
(4×4)
¶
, with
bβ
(4×1)
≡
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
bβ1bβ2bβ3bβ4
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ , β
0
(4×1)
≡
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
β01
β02
β03
β04
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ , and
with — in our case of four regressors (including the constant, or intercept) — variance-covariance
matrices
Ω0
(4×4)
≡
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
¡
ω011
¢2 ω012 ω013 ω014
ω021
¡
ω022
¢2 ω023 ω024
ω031 ω
0
32
¡
ω033
¢2 ω034
ω041 ω
0
42 ω
0
43
¡
ω044
¢2
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ ≡
≡
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
V ar
¡
β01
¢
Cov
¡
β01, β
0
2
¢
Cov
¡
β01, β
0
3
¢
Cov
¡
β01, β
0
4
¢
Cov
¡
β02, β
0
1
¢
V ar
¡
β02
¢
Cov
¡
β02, β
0
3
¢
Cov
¡
β02, β
0
4
¢
Cov
¡
β03, β
0
1
¢
Cov
¡
β03, β
0
2
¢
V ar
¡
β03
¢
Cov
¡
β03, β
0
4
¢
Cov
¡
β04, β
0
1
¢
Cov
¡
β04, β
0
2
¢
Cov
¡
β04, β
0
3
¢
V ar
¡
β04
¢
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ∼=
∼=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
dV ar ³bβ1´ dCov ³bβ1, bβ2´ dCov ³bβ1, bβ3´ dCov ³bβ1, bβ4´dCov ³bβ2, bβ1´ dV ar ³bβ2´ dCov ³bβ2, bβ3´ dCov ³bβ2, bβ4´dCov ³bβ3, bβ1´ dCov ³bβ3, bβ2´ dV ar ³bβ3´ dCov ³bβ3, bβ4´dCov ³bβ4, bβ1´ dCov ³bβ4, bβ2´ dCov ³bβ4, bβ3´ dV ar ³bβ4´
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
≡
≡
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
(bω11)2 bω12 bω13 bω14bω21 (bω22)2 bω23 bω24bω31 bω32 (bω33)2 bω34bω41 bω42 bω43 (bω44)2
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ≡ bΩ(4×4).
Analogously, we introduce the following matrix notation, now for the directly estimated coeﬃcients
of the reduced form:
bb
(4×1)
∼ N
µ
b0
(4×1)
, S0
(4×4)
¶
⇔
µ bb
(4×1)
− b0
(4×1)
¶
∼ N
µ
0
(4×1)
, S0
(4×4)
¶
, with
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bb
(4×1)
≡
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
bb1bb2bb3bb4
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ , b
0
(4×1)
≡
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
b01
b02
b03
b04
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ , and
S0
(4×4)
≡
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
¡
σ011
¢2 σ012 σ013 σ014
σ021
¡
σ022
¢2 σ023 σ024
σ031 σ032
¡
σ033
¢2 σ034
σ041 σ
0
42 σ
0
43
¡
σ044
¢2
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ ≡
≡
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
V ar
¡
b01
¢
Cov
¡
b01, b02
¢
Cov
¡
b01, b03
¢
Cov
¡
b01, b04
¢
Cov
¡
b02, b01
¢
V ar
¡
b02
¢
Cov
¡
b02, b03
¢
Cov
¡
b02, b04
¢
Cov
¡
b03, b01
¢
Cov
¡
b03, b02
¢
V ar
¡
b03
¢
Cov
¡
b03, b04
¢
Cov
¡
b04, b01
¢
Cov
¡
b04, b02
¢
Cov
¡
b04, b03
¢
V ar
¡
b04
¢
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ∼=
∼=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
dV ar ³bb1´ dCov ³bb1,bb2´ dCov ³bb1,bb3´ dCov ³bb1,bb4´dCov ³bb2,bb1´ dV ar ³bb2´ dCov ³bb2,bb3´ dCov ³bb2,bb4´dCov ³bb3,bb1´ dCov ³bb3,bb2´ dV ar ³bb3´ dCov ³bb3,bb4´dCov ³bb4,bb1´ dCov ³bb4,bb2´ dCov ³bb4,bb3´ dV ar ³bb4´
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
≡
≡
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
(bσ11)2 bσ12 bσ13 bσ14bσ21 (bσ22)2 bσ23 bσ24bσ31 bσ32 (bσ33)2 bσ34bσ41 bσ42 bσ43 (bσ44)2
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ≡ bS(4×4).
In general, for any vector -valued function of random variables (here, sample estimators) bβ and bb,
expanding around the respective true (or population) parameters by applying a first-order (linear) Taylor
approximation would result in (note the analogy with the scalar case presented earlier):
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
bβ1bβ2bβ3bβ4
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
∼= f
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
β01
β02
β03
β04
⎤
⎥⎥⎦+
∂f
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
β01
β02
β03
β04
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
∂
£
β1 β2 β3 β4
¤
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
bβ1 − β01bβ2 − β02bβ3 − β03bβ4 − β04
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦⇒
⇒
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
bβ1bβ2bβ3bβ4
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
∼= N
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
f
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
β01
β02
β03
β04
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ,
∂f
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
β01
β02
β03
β04
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
∂
£
β1 β2 β3 β4
¤ Ω0
(4×4)
∂f
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
β01
β02
β03
β04
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
∂
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
β1
β2
β3
β4
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
and
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
bb1bb2bb3bb4
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
∼= f
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
b01
b02
b03
b04
⎤
⎥⎥⎦+
∂f
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
b01
b02
b03
b04
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
∂
£
b1 b2 b3 b4
¤
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
bb1 − b01bb2 − b02bb3 − b03bb4 − b04
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦⇒
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⇒
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
bb1bb2bb3bb4
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
∼= N
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
f
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
b01
b02
b03
b04
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ,
∂f
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
b01
b02
b03
b04
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
∂
£
b1 b2 b3 b4
¤ S0
(4×4)
∂f
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
b01
b02
b03
b04
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
∂
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
b1
b2
b3
b4
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
.
7.2.2. Analytical Derivation of Our Delta Method Standard Error Computations. In our special case of
functional relationship of β0 = f
¡
b0
¢
estimated by bβ = f ³bb´, we have:
bβ = f ³bb´⇔
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
bβ1bβ2bβ3bβ4
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ = f
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
bb1bb2bb3bb4
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
bb1
1−bb4bb2
1−bb4bb3
1−bb4bb4
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, hence
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
bβ1bβ2bβ3bβ4
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
∼=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
bb1
1−bb4bb2
1−bb4bb3
1−bb4bb4
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
+
∂
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
bb1
1−bb4bb2
1−bb4bb3
1−bb4bb4
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
∂
£
b1 b2 b3 b4
¤
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
bb1 − b01bb2 − b02bb3 − b03bb4 − b04
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦⇒
⇒
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
bβ1bβ2bβ3bβ4
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
∼= N
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
bb1
1−bb4bb2
1−bb4bb3
1−bb4bb4
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
∂
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
bb1
1−bb4bb2
1−bb4bb3
1−bb4bb4
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
∂
£
b1 b2 b3 b4
¤ bS
(4×4)
∂
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
bb1
1−bb4bb2
1−bb4bb3
1−bb4bb4
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
∂
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
b1
b2
b3
b4
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
.
Hence:
∂
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
bb1
1−bb4bb2
1−bb4bb3
1−bb4bb4
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
∂
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
b1
b2
b3
b4
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1
1−bb4 0 0 1−2bb4(1−bb4)2
0 1
1−bb4 0 1−2bb4(1−bb4)2
0 0 1
1−bb4 1−2bb4(1−bb4)2
0 0 0 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
=
1³
1−bb4´2
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1−bb4 0 0 1− 2bb4
0 1−bb4 0 1− 2bb4
0 0 1−bb4 1− 2bb4
0 0 0
³
1−bb4´2
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
Next, the transpose of the above matrix will be:
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⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1
1−bb4 0 0 1−2bb4(1−bb4)2
0 1
1−bb4 0 1−2bb4(1−bb4)2
0 0 1
1−bb4 1−2bb4(1−bb4)2
0 0 0 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
T
=
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1
1−bb4 0 0 0
0 1
1−bb4 0 0
0 0 1
1−bb4 0
1−2bb4
(1−bb4)2 1−2bb4(1−bb4)2 1−2bb4(1−bb4)2 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
∂
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
bb1
1−bb4bb2
1−bb4bb3
1−bb4bb4
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
∂
£
b1 b2 b3 b4
¤ =
=
1³
1−bb4´2
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
1−bb4 0 0 0
0 1−bb4 0 0
0 0 1−bb4 0
1− 2bb4 1− 2bb4 1− 2bb4 (1− b4)2
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
Now we are ready to write:
dV ar
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
bβ1bβ2bβ3bβ4
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
∼= dV ar
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
bb1
1−bb4bb2
1−bb4bb3
1−bb4bb4
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
=
1³
1−bb4´4
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1−bb4 0 0 0
0 1−bb4 0 0
0 0 1−bb4 0
1− 2bb4 1− 2bb4 1− 2bb4 ³1−bb4´2
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
S
(4×4)
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1−bb4 0 0 1− 2bb4
0 1−bb4 0 1− 2bb4
0 0 1−bb4 1− 2bb4
0 0 0
³
1−bb4´2
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
=
1³
1−bb4´4
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1−bb4 0 0 0
0 1−bb4 0 0
0 0 1−bb4 0
1− 2bb4 1− 2bb4 1− 2bb4 ³1−bb4´2
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
(bσ11)2 bσ12 bσ13 bσ14bσ21 (bσ22)2 bσ23 bσ24bσ31 bσ32 (bσ33)2 bσ34bσ41 bσ42 bσ43 (bσ44)2
⎤
⎥⎥⎦×
×
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1−bb4 0 0 1− 2bb4
0 1−bb4 0 1− 2bb4
0 0 1−bb4 1− 2bb4
0 0 0
³
1−bb4´2
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
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= 1
(1−bb4)4
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
³
1−bb4´ (bσ11)2 ³1−bb4´ bσ12 ³1−bb4´ bσ13 ³1−bb4´ bσ14³
1−bb4´ bσ21 ³1−bb4´ (bσ22)2 ³1−bb4´ bσ23 ³1−bb4´ bσ24³
1−bb4´ bσ31 ³1−bb4´ bσ32 ³1−bb4´ (bσ33)2 ³1−bb4´ bσ34bc41 bc42 bc43 bc44
with:bc41 = ³1− 2bb4´h(bσ11)2 + bσ21 + bσ31i+ ³1−bb4´2 bσ41bc42 = ³1− 2bb4´hbσ12 + (bσ22)2 + bσ32i+ ³1−bb4´2 bσ42bc43 = ³1− 2bb4´hbσ13 + bσ23 + (bσ33)2i+ ³1−bb4´2 bσ43bc44 = ³1− 2bb4´ [bσ14 + bσ24 + bσ34] + ³1−bb4´2 (bσ44)2
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
×
×
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1−bb4 0 0 1− 2bb4
0 1−bb4 0 1− 2bb4
0 0 1−bb4 1− 2bb4
0 0 0
³
1−bb4´2
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
=
1³
1−bb4´4
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
³
1−bb4´2 (bσ11)2 ³1−bb4´2 bσ12 ³1−bb4´2 bσ13 bd14³
1−bb4´2 bσ21 ³1−bb4´2 (bσ22)2 ³1−bb4´2 bσ23 bd24³
1−bb4´2 bσ31 ³1−bb4´2 bσ32 ³1−bb4´2 (bσ33)2 bd34bd41 bd42 bd43 bd44
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, with
bd14 = ³1−bb4´³1− 2bb4´ h(bσ11)2 + bσ12 + bσ13i+ ³1−bb4´3 bσ14
bd24 = ³1−bb4´³1− 2bb4´ hbσ21 + (bσ22)2 + bσ23i+ ³1−bb4´3 bσ24
bd34 = ³1−bb4´³1− 2bb4´ hbσ31 + bσ32 + (bσ33)2i+ ³1−bb4´3 bσ34
bd41 = ³1−bb4´³1− 2bb4´ h(bσ11)2 + bσ21 + bσ31i+ ³1−bb4´3 bσ41
bd42 = ³1−bb4´³1− 2bb4´ hbσ12 + (bσ22)2 + bσ32i+ ³1−bb4´3 bσ42
bd43 = ³1−bb4´³1− 2bb4´ hbσ13 + bσ23 + (bσ33)2i+ ³1−bb4´3 bσ43
bd44 = ³1−bb4´2 ³1− 2bb4´ [bσ41 + bσ42 + bσ43 + bσ14 + bσ24 + bσ34] +
+
³
1− 2bb4´2 h(bσ11)2 + bσ21 + bσ31 + bσ12 + (bσ22)2 + bσ32 + bσ13 + bσ23 + (bσ33)2i+
+
³
1−bb4´4 (bσ44)2 =
=
³
1−bb4´2 ³1− 2bb4´ 2 [bσ14 + bσ24 + bσ34] +
+
³
1− 2bb4´2 h(bσ11)2 + (bσ22)2 + (bσ33)2 + 2 (bσ12 + bσ13 + bσ23)i+
+
³
1−bb4´4 (bσ44)2 .
The square root of the analytical expressions for the diagonal elements of the variance-covariance
matrix derived above was then used in our programs25 to compute the standard errors of the structural
25These EViews programs are available upon request.
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parameters of interest, β0,+k ≡ bβ1, βπ,+k ≡ bβ2, βx,+q ≡ bβ3 and βi,−1 ≡ bβ4, reported in our tables in
Appendix A in the notation we established in the present paper.
7.3. The Delta Method: Application to Backward-Looking Taylor Rules. Recovering the long-
run policy response parameters, which is often of interest — e.g., in Nelson (2000, 2001, 2003) — out
of the directly estimated short-run parameters in backward-looking Taylor rules and computing delta
method standard errors for the former can be explained by analogy to what we already did for our
forward-looking rules.26
Now we estimated directly:
it = b0,−1 + bπ,−1πt−1 + bx,−1xt−1 + bi,−1it−1 + et.
In a long-run equilibrium,
it = it−1 = i,
so that
i = b0,−1 + bπ,−1πt−1 + bx,−1xt−1 + bi,−1i,
and solving for i, one obtains:
i =
b0,−1
1− bi,−1| {z }
≡β0,−1
+
bπ,−1
1− bi,−1| {z }
≡βπ,−1
πt−1 +
bx,−1
1− bi,−1| {z }
≡βx,−1
xt−1,
with the respective long-run intercept β0,−1 and responses βπ,−1 and βx,−1, as defined above.
Re-defining β0,−1 ≡ β1, βπ,−1 ≡ β2, βx,−1 ≡ β3, b0,−1 ≡ b1, bπ,−1 ≡ b2, bx,−1 ≡ b3 and βi,−1 ≡
bi,−1 ≡ b4 ≡ β4 like we did in the preceding subsection, for an easier matrix manipulation, results in
the same derivation for the computation of standard errors in the case of four relevant coeﬃcients, as
appropriate here.27 Accordingly, our long-run responses and their standard errors from backward -looking
Taylor rules were computed using the same formulas but diﬀerent numerical values (i.e., from diﬀerent
estimated equations) as those for the forward-looking rules, provided that the number of parameters of
interest (hence, the rank of the matrices involved in the delta method) is 4.28
26We do not report, however, such long-run responses and their delta method standard errors for the regressions in
Table 4 because of the uninterpretable results (due to a likely misspecification, as the coeﬃcients to the lagged dependent
variable indicate, especially for the period of operational independence).
27We have not derived and computed delta method standard errors for the version of our forward-looking equations
with an explicit exchange rate term (in Table 11) and, hence, a rank of 5 for the matrices to be manipulated as shown
above, again because of regression results which are diﬃcult to interpret (due to a likely misspecification, as commented
earlier).
28Our EViews programs are available upon request.
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